Title: New Article 135-A
Volume: Volume VIII (16th May to 16th June 1949)
Date: 31/05/1949
Participants: Prof. K. T. Shah, Dr. P. S. Deshmukh, Sardar Hukum Singh, The Chairman (Dr.
Rajendra Prasad)
Constituent
Assembly Debates (Proceedings)- Volume VIII
Tuesday, the 31st May, 1949
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The Constituent Assembly of India met in the Constitution Hall, New Delhi at
Eight of the Clock Mr. President (The Honourable Dr. Rajendra Prasad) in the
Chair.
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TAKING THE PLEDGE AND SIGNING THE
REGISTER
The following Member took the Pledge and signed the Register
:-
Sardar Ranjit Singh [Patiala and East Punjab States Union.]
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Seth Govind Das (C. P. & Berar : General) : *[Mr. President, Sir, I
would like to draw you attention to a fact which, in my opinion, is of major
importance. You are perhaps aware of the fact that some Members of the House
have Hindi numerals on the number plates of their cars. Delhi police recently
filed a case against one of the Members for using Hindi numerals on the
number-plate of his car and he has been find by the Court. I have come to know
that some more similar cases against a few other Members are pending. This is a
matter which relates to the privileges of the Members of the Members of the
House. Indeed it is very surprising, rather a matter of shame, that even in
independent India Members of this House are prosecuted for having numerals in
the national language on the plates of their cars. I do not know if this matter
was already before you. But at any rate I want to draw your attention to it and
request that proper action should be taken in this matter.]
Shri Mohan Lal Gautam (United Provinces : General) : *[Mr. President, I
have to convey a minor piece of information to the House. I have Hindi numerals
on the number plate of my car registered in U. P. This car has been in Delhi
for a long time. Shri Keskar and a few other Members also have Hindi numerals
on the plates on their cars. Recently when going from the House in my car, the
Delhi police registered a case against me for using Hindi numerals on the plate
of my car. The case is yet pending. I do not know what would be the outcome of
this case. This is a fact and I have placed it before the House for
information.]
Shri R. K. Sidhva (C. P. & Berar : General) : I want to speak, Sir.
Mr. President : About the same matter?
Shri R. K. Sidhva : No.
Mr. President : I shall dispose of this. As this is a matter which
requires looking into. I shall ask the Secretary to consider what steps have to
be taken.
I understand Pandit Kunzru wants to say something to complete what was said
yesterday.
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DRAFT CONSTITUTION-(Contd.)
Article 131-(Contd.)
Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru (United Provinces : General) : I am grateful
to you. Sir, for permitting me to answer the question Mr. Kher put to me
yesterday. He wanted to know whether I was in favour of the amendment proposing
nomination of Governors. I made it clear at the outset yesterday that I opposed
the principle of election even two years ago. I consider nomination better than
election; but I shall regard it as satisfactory only if article 175 is amended
as suggested by me yesterday and as regard to apparently by Mr. T. T.
Krishnamachari, and article 188 is deleted. I ask for the deletion of article
188 because the Governor who will now be nominated should not be able to
exercise the power of setting aside his Cabinet and taking the administration
into his own hands which he was to have when he was to be elected. If these two
amendments are made, I should consider the principle of nomination to be
unobjectionable.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari (Madras : General) : Pandit Kunzru has referred
to some undertaking given by me. I am not in a position to give any
undertaking, nor is any undertaking given by me of any use, so far as binding
this House is concerned.
Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru : I did not say that Mr. Krishnamachari spoke
on behalf of the Drafting Committee or even on behalf of Dr. Ambedkar. I only
expressed my pleasure that a careful student of constitutional affairs like my
Friend, Mr. T. T. Krishnamachari, agreed to the suggestion that I made.
Mr. President : Before we start discussing this article, I might tell
honourable Members that we should expedite the consideration of the
Constitution. I have given great latitude to Members and I expect reciprocation
from their side so that we might go through the Constitution as quickly as
possible. In some cases I have allowed speeches which were not strictly
relevant to the amendment under consideration, because I felt that some
view-points were put forward which might deserve consideration if not exactly
in connection with that particular article but in connection with some other
article which might come at a later stage. Apart from that, I would ask
honourable Members to bear in mind that we should not have repetition of
arguments and no honourable Member need speak if he thinks that the point does
not require any further clarification or that he is going to make any
contribution which is not already before the House. With this appeal, I would
now start the discussion, and I hope that Members will bear this in mind.
Dr. P.K. Sen (Bihar : General) : Mr. President, Sir, in this matter it
is obvious that a great change has come over the honourable Members of this
House since the last decision was taken and I must also confess that I am one
of those Members who have changed their views. At that particular point of
time, when the last decision was taken, I remember very well the consideration
that weight with the Members, was as to the manner in which the Governor should
be elected so as to be able to interfere with the government if party factions
and cliques threatened to break it up or to paralyse its activities. At that
time it was felt that the Governor, in order that he might have the strength so
to interfere should be able to feel that he had the backing of the whole
province behind him. It was for this reason that a great deal of emphasis was
laid upon the form in which he was to be chosen, and it was decided that it
should not be by appointment or selection but should be by election,--and not
only election but election by adult suffrage. Since then on sober and serious
reflection evidently the Members of the House are now persuaded that a general
election of that kind whereby the Governor was to be elected by adult suffrage
would impose a tremendous strain upon each province and would hardly subserve
the purpose for which it was being held. What is the purpose? The upholding of
democratic ideas. The question is whether by interfering, the Governor would be
upholding the democratic idea or subverting it. It would really be a surrender
of democracy. We have decided that the Governor should be a constitutional
head. The Premier with his Council of Ministers is really responsible for the
good governance of the province. The whole of the executive power is vested in
the Premier and his Council of Ministers. That being so, if there is another
person who is able to feel that he has got the backing of the whole province
behind him and therefore he can come forward and intervene in the governance of
the province, it would really amount to a surrender or subversion of democracy.
It would make it impossible for the Premier or his Council of Ministers to
initiate measures which would be in the best interest of the province. Only in
exceptional cases of emergency should he have the power or the function to step
in and interfere with the actual governance of the province for a short time.
Of course, the conditions and circumstances must be such as would justify the
exercise of emergency powers and those conditions have been indicated elsewhere.
Ordinarily, however, his function is not to interfere but to remain detached.
Therefore in the best interest of democracy, in the best interest of
parliamentary form of government which has been decided upon as the basis of
the Draft Constitution, the election of the Governor by adult suffrage is
uncalled for and inappropriate.
The next method of election that is suggested is election by the legislature.
There too there would be mischief--only in another form--and a conflict would arise
between the Premier and his Council of Ministers on the one hand and the
Governor and certain other sections or factions which would be in his support.
Therefore I believe that it would, instead of being in the interests of
parliamentary government, be a thorn on the side of the Premier and the Council
of Ministers and would prevent them from carrying out any measures which are in
the best interest of the province. What then? We have now to look out for some
other appropriate method. If we are satisfied that both the forms of election
which form the substance of article 131--there are the two above-mentioned
forms given there--would not subserve the purpose of democracy, what is the
next alternative? The alternative that is placed before us is that the
appointment of the Governor should be in the hands of the President who, by
Convention, shall act upon the advice of the Prime Minister at the Centre. Now,
it has been said by some of the honourable Members who have spoken on the
subject that it would not really be in the interests of democracy to vest so
much power in the hands of the President. The question then is where lies the
balance of advantage. The two forms of election being out of the way, can we or
can we not vest this power in the hands of the President who is to act on the
advice of the Prime Minister? The President being detached from the province
would be able to act in a manner perfectly in conformity with the interests of
the province, whether his nominee be of the province or of any other part of
the country. There is also a great advantage in having a person who is detached
from the province--I do not say that necessarily the selection will be from
outside the province--but supposing it were it would be an advantage because
that person would come to the province with a free mind perfectly detached,
perfectly unassociated with the different factions, or different sections of
opinion, in the province.
The function that the Governor has to fulfil, as it is now borne in upon the Members
of the House, is that of a lubricator, if I may use the expression. He is not
to interfere, but he has just to smooth matters. If there are factions, if the
different sections of the community are at loggerheads with each other, it is
for him to act more or less as a lubricator, a cementing factor. He is to help
the machinery of Government which is in the hands of the Prime Minister and the
Council of Ministers; he is not to come and interfere and cause confusion or
chaos; he would be the person really to lubricate the machinery and to see to
it that all the wheels are going well by reason not of his interference, but
his friendly intervention. That being the conception of the Governor, as it is,
I believe, Sir, that it would be in the interests of good environment, if the
House were to come unanimously to the opinion that the only possible method by
which the Governor might be chosen by the method of nomination by the
President.
Shri Biswanath Das (Orissa : General) : Sir, in discussing article 131
regarding election of the Governor, I realize the difficulties of an election
of a general nature in which every adult person in the province is called upon
to vote. That is a difficult process and it is bound to create complications. I
had therefore given notice of an amendment, that is, No 2023, not being
satisfied with the alternative that was proposed by the Drafting Committee. Be
the amendment what it is, we have to submit to the joint wisdom of honourable
Members. Sir, in the course of discussion of this question, Mr. Alladi
Krishnaswami Ayyar invited our attention to the British precedents. I request
him to cite me a precedent from Britain wherein a British Governor is being
nominated. The only precedent I could think of is the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was always a non official nominated by the
cabinet. If the British precedent has any use for him, it is just the other
way. Sir, the Canadian precedent has been quoted, but I would plead with him
and tell him that the process that we propose to adopt will be more akin to the
South African system, where you have very little of autonomy for the provinces.
Sir, that being the position however great your anxiety may be to hasten the
passage of the Constitution, the course of action taken by honourable Members
causes delay. Important propositions which were discussed and adopted in this
House are being given the go-by; important changes are being proposed in the
meanwhile. Therefore, it gives occasion for discussion, and discussion means
delay. Therefore, I would plead with you that we on this side of the House have
done nothing to earn your advice, or crave for your advice, for we have never
desired to crave for consideration or indulgence. Sir, it has been stated that
the Governor has very little functions. If he has very little functions under
the set up that we have laid down in the new Constitution, then why have him.
The Governor is getting a decent salary and he is getting allowances and if the
functions prescribed for him are not very useful and necessary and not worth
the money that we pay, I think it is time that we give the go-by to the
Governor. I claim, that the new set-up, unless this House proposes to change
the new set-up, invests the Governors with definite and important powers. The
powers are the ordinances, powers, of course, in a modified way which you have
under the Government of India act of 1935, to return Bills for consideration of
the Assembly and dismissal of Ministers and calling for elections. I claim that
these are very important powers under the new set-up. Therefore, a change in
the Constitution that we have so far accepted means a change in all these items
of responsibility that we have at present. If these powers continue to operate,
I claim that the Governor under the new set-up has an important constitutional
role to function. I have my bitter experiences in this regard. I was the Prime
Minister of a province and I know how the Governor of my province was out to
break my party. I know those days are gone and new days are coming ahead and I
will plead with my honourable Friends to look at the future. If I were to have
my leaders in office continuously, if I were to have men like Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, I have absolutely, no complaint. But I
plead with my honourable Friends that human life is temporary, however long and
however much we desire; human life is temporary; the existence of parties,
emergence of parties have to face elevation--ups and downs of parties are there,
and world history has enough examples of such cases. That being the position. I
want to plead with the honourable Members to look into the future and see how
far the new set-up that they purpose to have, will work and function properly
and well.
What is the set-up that you are going to have? You are going to have the party
system as the basis of democracy. It has been claimed in the newspapers that
the present Constituent Assembly (Legislative) has no opposition and as such
the Congress Party is having its own way. I do not at all agree and I join
issue with people holding this opinion. However, whatever the criticism may be,
the fact remains that democracy to make itself useful to the country and to the
State must have a party system well organised and functioning properly. That
being the accepted position, there is no knowing which party will be in power.
It may be that a party absolutely different from that in the Centre may be
functioning in office in a province. What then would be the position? The
Governor, who is a Constitutional Governor under the Act has to be appointed on
the advice of the Prime Minister of India, leader of another Party. My
honourable Friend, Mr. Kher, made a distinct contribution to this discussion.
His contribution is this, viz., the Governor is being appointed in
consultation with the Cabinet. If that were so,--I do not know what it is--the
selection becomes less objectionable. But reference to the Legislate Assembly
discussions shows that the Prime Minister appoints the Governor. The Prime
Minister today is one of the tallest of the few men in the world. You may
expect justice and you do expect justice in his hands. He has no axes to grind.
But there may be a Prime Minister in the Centre who may have his own axes to
grind. Is it anything serious to expect that a party functioning with its
majority in the province may be interfered with if he proposes to play the role
that was just now discussed by my honourable Friend the jurist member, Dr. Sen?
Therefore, I feel and join issue with those friends who feel that the set-up
that we propose under the new Constitution will be useful. I claim that you
cannot have both ways. You cannot have democracy and autocracy functioning
together. In the provinces you are going to have democracy from toe to neck and
autocracy at the head. Both these are bound to fail; you are inviting friction.
I know I will not vote against it because as I have stated I submit to the
joint wisdom. But, I must clearly state here and place on record my views and
what I see the future of it is going to be. I have experienced myself and I
have no hesitation that this experience which I have had in my life will repeat
itself. If the Honourable Sardar Patel were here, I would have cited how the
Governor, who was an agent of British Imperialism, had all along been
attempting to smash my party. What was being done by the Governor under British
Imperialism may also be repeated by the party, though I have no hesitation in
saying that my leaders would not stoop to or even think in the way in which
things were being done.
We are told that this is one of the devices to bring harmony into the
provinces. How could you bring harmony? It is impossible. You can never bring
harmony by these acts. I could understand my honourable Friend Mr. Brajeshwar
Prasad. His has been an undiluted paternal autocracy and he is for scrapping
the entire Constitution; he does not have any faith in democracy. I do not
agree but I respect his views. You cannot, as I have already stated, have it both
ways; you cannot have democracy and autocracy together. My honourable Friend
says, if the Prime Minister at the Centre who is responsible to the people of
India nominates, it could not be autocracy. It will not be democracy either. It
may be a nomination of the President under the advice of the Prime Minister;
but it really is a nomination of the Prime Minister and in no event could it be
democracy. We are giving powers to the villagers; we organise village
panchayats. You authorise the Panchayat to elect its President. Would you in
this Constitution deny the same right to the Assembly? My honourable Friend Mr.
Ramalingam Chettiar had gone a step forward and he wanted to increase the size
of the electorate in the province, by bringing in the District Boards,
Municipalities in the arena of election. That is one aspect of the question
which we may have to explore; but it was rejected. I am not sorry for its
rejection; nor have I been pleading for it. What I say is this : you cannot
refuse, nor could you justify this refusal to the Assembly to have its own
elected Governor. There may be reasons to say, that an adult suffrage elected
Governor and a responsible Premier functioning is nowhere in the world and as
such not very desirable. That may be justifiable. In fact, when in the 1947
session this was debated, I pleaded with the Members that this would not be
proper; but that was not accepted, and as I have stated I am always prepared to
respect and follow the joint wisdom of the party and of this Assembly. In that
view of the question, I had accepted it. It looks to me that constant change
has been the fame and reputation of the honourable Members of this Assembly. We
appointed a Committee; it had as its President a person no less than the
Honourable Sardar Patel. The unanimous recommendation of the Committee was
embodied in this Draft Constitution. Well, Sir, very question was discussed
thoroughly in this House and then it was sent to the Drafting Committee. Now,
we come forward for such an important and basic change in the set up of the
Constitution. If this is to go on, I think it is unfair to the Members who have
absented themselves feeling probably that changes in the Constitution will not
be root and branch.
Mr. President : No Member is entitled to absent himself in the hope that
his vote will not be required. Every Member is expected to be in his place. Mr.
Biswanath Das was saying that some Members were absent in the expectation that
the draft would be accepted as it is and therefore I have said that no Member
should take anything for granted and it is his duty to be here when the
Assembly is sitting.
Shri Biswanath Das : I am thankful to the Chair and also to the Member
who has protested against this but is it wrong to assume or at least far too wrong
to assume that there will not be changes root and branch because it was once
fully discussed in the Assembly?
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi (Madras : General) : Absolutely wrong.
An Honourable Member : Then why have you come here?
Shri Biswanath Das : Another Friend says ‘Why have I come here? I know
and he also knows the why, Sir, I do not want to proceed with this
interpretation. I feel that it is my duty and my responsibility to place on
record hour in this matter. Also let me state that I have consulted all the
Members of the delegation from Orissa and Orissa States and all of them agree
with my feeling that this will not work properly.
Shrimati G. Durga Bai (Madras : General) : Mr. President, Sir, I stand
here to support the amendment moved by my Friend Shri Brajeshwar Prasadji and
supported by my Friend Mr. Kamath. Sir, I must frankly confess that I also for
some time held the view that the system of election by direct vote would be a
better one compared to every other system. But I should say that I have changed
my views in the matter because I am one of those who have given some thought to
this question and come to the conclusion that the proposal of nomination or
appointment as suggested in the amendment is a better one in the circumstances
that we have today. Sir, I find that those friends who opposed this proposal of
appointment by the President did it mainly or two grounds, that it would be
inconsistent with the principle of democracy and also it would be giving too
much power to the President. With regard to their fear that the ideal of
democracy would suffer a good deal if people were deprived of their right of
franchise in favour of Governor and that the ideology behind that--the freedom
to exercise their vote--would be defeated if this power is given to the
President, I may say that the usefulness or otherwise of any institution should
be judged by the results that ultimately the institution would yield. Certain
functions are expected to be discharged by the Governor. We wanted to introduce
the Governor in our Constitution because we thought that an element of harmony
would be there and that institution would bring about some sort of
understanding and harmony between the conflicting groups of people, if really
the Governor is conscious of his duties and he functions well. It is only for
this purpose this is proposed, the governing idea is to place the Governor
above party politics, above factions and not to subject him to the party
affairs. Now, we find a section in the draft article 135 wherein it is said
that he is not to be a member of either of the Legislatures or, even if he was
a member at the time when the choice may fall on him, he is expected to resign
before he is appointed or elected as Governor. The idea behind it is that he
should be above party politics and party factions. May I ask those friends
whether this idea would be realised if we make him dependent upon the mercy of
the people and make him subject to party affairs? If he is to depend on the
mercy of the people for votes, I am afraid the idea that he would be a
harmonious element in the constitution of our country would not be realised.
Therefore, I feel that the election system as proposed by some, as against the
amendment, is very dangerous. The other point which my Friends who opposed
nomination is that it would be giving too much power to the President. May I
ask whether the President does not mean his Prime Minister, and the Prime
Minister in his turn would not consult his colleagues before making the choice?
Those in favour of this system of appointment said yesterday that a happy and
healthy convention would grow of consulting the Provincial Prime Ministers. I
think already the system has grown and is growing that whenever a Governor is
appointed to a province, the Chief Minister of that Province is invariably
consulted. Therefore I think the fear of my friends that the President would
not discharge his responsibilities well and in the interest of the country is
absolutely groundless. Therefore it would be quite safe to leave the entire
responsibility to the President and I do not see any danger why we should not
leave it if that could be discharged with great caution and I may tell my
friends that the person who is to take the responsibility of such a magnitude
would not easily take it and would take it after a great hesitation because he
knows that he has got to face the criticism of my friends like Shri Rohini
Kumar Chaudhuri or Shri Biswanath Das or friends who oppose this idea and who
are afraid of giving this power to the President. Therefore, I suggest that
there is absolutely no danger and it is always open to those people to go and
tell the President that whenever a man is not wanted why he is not wanted and
therefore he is to be removed on certain grounds.
Therefore, I feel that there is absolutely no danger in that system of
appointment and I urge on my friends to be convinced by this argument that this
would be a safer method in the present circumstances. The Drafting Committee itself
has changed its view and has put forward an alternative proposal, viz.,
to appoint one of the four candidates out of a panel of four candidates to be
elected by the Houses. Sir, this is a proposal which has no counterpart or
similarity in the whole world and also it is impossible to defend this panel
business on its merits. I would say that this will not carry any responsibility
but on the other hand carries all the disadvantages of a divided
responsibility. It carries no responsibility of either the President or the
Cabinet or the Provincial Cabinet because the responsibility here is very much
divided. In this panel system there is this danger that if the votes recorded
vary, as they are bound to vary, and if the President happens to pick up a man
who has secured less number of votes, the person chosen will come into clash
with the Provincial Legislature. Therefore he would be naturally unwilling to
take up that responsibility. Ultimately, therefore, it would resolve itself
into an election by the House itself. An election or appointment which rests on
the House, I do not think, carries much importance.
I should also say that the system of proportional representation would not
improve matters in any way. That will only produce the effect that it would
divide the whole House into warring groups and it will also produce all the
disadvantages and defects of the French system. This experiment of panels and
appointment from the panel is already tried in some of our universities today
and it cannot be said that this has worked well. Every appointment has resulted
in a disappointment. Ultimately, the defeated candidate, transforming himself
into the opposition, has brought about a lot of trouble to the Vice-Chancellor.
Therefore, I do not see any reason why we should not have recourse to the
simple and straight procedure of appointment by the President. Sir, with these
words, I heartily support the amendment of Shri Brajeshwar Prasad.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena (United Provinces : General) : Mr. President
Sir, I consider this clause as one of the most important ones in the
Constitution. We have modelled our Constitution on the British model, and in
that model there is the King and in ours we have put our President in his
place.
The King, in the Constitution, has almost no functions, he is a cipher; but the
cipher is on the right side of the digits, and it is very well known that the
King exerts a powerful influence on the politics of England. I therefore say
that if we are modelling our Constitution on the British model, we must give
our President and Governors the dignity that the King enjoys in England. I feel
that this dignity cannot be given to the Governor if he is a nominee of the
President. If he is elected by the adult votes of the people, then alone can he
get, can he acquire the dignity that the King enjoys in England. He has a
dignity which surpasses that of all other persons. If we are trying to shape
our Constitution on the British model, then we must not forget the fact that
the Governor must not be a mere figure-head but should have the dignity and
prestige of the King. At present the Centre has appointed Governors in all the
provinces, but they have not the necessary prestige. I know many of them would
not have been elected if they were to be chosen by election. I am not happy
about the appointment in my own province, and I feel the people of my province
would not have elected the Governor who has been appointed there. This practice
if continued will defeat the purpose of the Constitution which is modelled on
the British model.
Secondly, it has been said that if the Governor is elected, he will have
greater prestige than the Premier of the Province, and then there will be
clashes. I do not see why it should be so. Both these elected persons will be
patriots and will love their province, and the country. They will try to show,
when they work, that they can work in the interest of the province. They will
show that, when they both occupy these high offices, they can adjust their
personal predilections, and work in the interest of the province. I see no
reason why there should be any clash. Most probably the Premier and the
Governor will be elected by the support of the majority party, and so probably
they will both belong to the same party. Even if they are not of the same party
as will happen only when parties are very evenly balanced, and if one party
gives the Premier and the other the Governor then both the parties will have to
co-operate and, this will ensure co-operation of all the voters, and so the
province as a whole will have the benefits of the co-operation of both sections
of the House. So no clash need be apprehended. These great men whom the people
of the whole province will elect will be wise enough to devote all their
abilities to the good of the province. They will never quarrel, and they will
see that all quarrels are subordinated to the interests of the province.
Then it has been said that there need be no fear that the Centre will have too
much power. Already we have invested the President with a lot of power, and it
has been said that we do so because he is not a party man. He is to be elected
by all the legislatures. Therefore he need not be a party man. But the
President will act on the advice of the Prime Minister. So the party in power
at the Centre will nominate all the Governors in all the provinces. It will
also nominate all the Judges of the Supreme Court and other big officials. That
is not a good thing. I cannot subscribe to the view that a single person should
have the power to nominate all these high officers. We should remember that
absolute power is not a good thing. It corrupts absolutely. If we clothe one
single person, the Prime Minister, however good he may be, with all these powers--and
all may not have the caliber of the present Prime Minister, and there might be
some Prime Ministers who might misuse this power--it will be dangerous and it
is not proper to give the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister
the power to nominate the Governors. We are also providing that the Governor
will have the power to take over the affairs of his province in the event of an
emergency. This he cannot do, unless he enjoys the confidence of the people of
the province. He will not have the confidence of the people unless he is a man
elected by the people, and they will not let him take over the powers in an
emergency. So the Governor must be elected by the people.
It has been said that the Centre should have over-all powers over the province.
If the idea is to have a single unitary constitution, I would have welcomed it.
But now with the present Constitution as it is, we must leave it to the
patriotism of the people of the provinces to try and to act in such a way that
the Centre is powerful and that they are working in co-ordination with the
Centre. And if the people are left to themselves, they will see that the
Governor is such as will co-operate with the Centre and discharge his functions
in the interests of the country. We must trust the people and their patriotism.
It has been said that election of the Governor by adult suffrage would be a
very difficult task. But we all know that all the members of the Assemblies
will be elected by adult suffrage. Along with the election of the members, the
Governors can also be elected at the same time. I submit that the powers of the
Governor should not be given to a person who does not enjoy the confidence of
the whole people. The original suggestion of Dr. Ambedkar should be one that
should be accepted.
Shri K. M. Munshi (Bombay: General): Mr. President, Sir, I would not
have intervened in this debate at this late stage had it not been for the
remarks that fell from my Friend Mr. Biswanath Das. I am afraid the remarks are
likely to be understood in an unfortunate manner, if the whole position
relating to the new amendment was not placed before the House at this stage.
It must be remembered that in 1947 when this question was discussed in the
joint sitting of the Union Constitution Committee and the Provincial
Constitution Committee there were two diametrically opposed views. That was in
the beginning of the career of the Constituent Assembly. One view was that
India as a whole should adopt the American model and the other, that it should
adopt the British model. At one time the general opinion fluctuated from one to
the other. Ultimately, however, so far as the general opinion was concerned, it
veered round in favour of the British model both in the Centre and in the
Provinces.
There was an intermediate position which some people favoured. It was felt that
if at any time it was impossible to form a majority government either in the
Centre or in the Provinces and there was fragmentation of political parties, a
strong President and Governor elected on adult franchise and backed by the
authority of the electorate would give stability to the Government.
When this proposal was mooted, a curious situation arose. With regard to the
Centre that opinion was not upheld, it was decided that the President at the
Centre should be a constitutional head and should not be directly elected by
the adult franchise of the whole country. But the position of the Governor
remained as it was in the old scheme. The co-ordinated scheme of both the President
and the governor being elected by adult franchise, so that they would have
prestige in the country and power to stabilise Government, was this broken up.
After we have adopted the British model, the election of the Governor by adult
franchise in the province remained an anomaly, a completely out-of-date and
absurd thing. Imagine a Governor being elected by adult franchise of all the
citizens in a province. The persons who are at the top of the political life of
the province would sooner prefer to be the Prime Minister and Ministers with
effective power in their hands. Therefore, the party in power when it goes to
the election will put up a person who is not as outstanding as the prospective
ministers for that office of Governor, with the result that the best man in the
party will not be available for it.
The expenditure and energy of a province under election would have been wasted
in putting a second rate man in the party at the head of the Government. That
would mean that he will be subsidiary in importance to the Prime Minister, as
he would be his nominee. If that is going to be the case, there is no reason
why the farce of a huge election has to be undergone.
In April last, both the Committees met again, considered this question and
ultimately came to the conclusion that as the post of an elected Governor would
be completely useless from the point of view of his having any controlling
voice in the government, there was no need for going through the process. It
was also felt and very rightly felt that if one member of a party was elected
by the adult franchise of all the citizens, while the Prime Minister was there
as only the leader of the majority party in the Legislative Assembly, in the
event of a conflict between them, the position of the Governor may be superior
to that of the Prime Minister. With the prestige of a general election by adult
franchise he might seek in a given contingency to override the powers of the
Prime Minister. That would inevitably lead to a conflict. This possibility has
to be obviated. The present scheme is that the Prime Minister who is the leader
of the majority party should, like the Prime Minister of England, have the
controlling voice in the affairs of the province or the government. Having two
persons like that in a province might lead to an unfortunate situation in the
provinces. It was from that point of view that the Joint Committee ultimately
decided that the best way would be to eliminate the election of the Governor.
The danger becomes clear, if you see the old scheme, part of which is given in
article 144(6). It says “the functions of the Governor under this article with
respect to the appointment and dismissal of ministers shall be exercised by him
in his discretion.” So discretionary power was given to him to dismiss or
appoint ministers. This is a very much wider power than could be exercised by a
constitutional head of a province. Therefore this power is going to be removed.
If that is so, the government in the province will be more in the nature of
responsible government after the British model.
We have to consider the position only in this way. Would it ensure for the
better government of the province to have a nominated governor or an elected
governor? If there was a nominated governor, his power of dismissing ministers
at his discretion naturally would go. He would remain a constitutional head.
The Government would be practically run by the Premier and his party so long as
the ministry is stable.
My Friend Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar drew upon the analogy of Canada. With
great respect for his profound learning I beg to differ. I do not think that
the Governor that we envisage by this amendment, namely a nominated governor,
is on the same lines as the Governor of Canada who is more or less an
instrument of the Government of England, though a constitutional head. Here he
will be nominated, no doubt, but his power, if the government is stable, will
only be confined to what is contained in article 147, that is, he may submit
for the consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a
decision has been taken by a minister but which has not been considered by the
Council. Therefore there is nothing of importance that he has to do except to
ask for a reconsideration of certain decisions. Consider this again. Would it
not be better to have an independent person bringing a detached frame of mind
on this question rather than have more or less a nominee or a follower of the
Prime Minister himself, if he has to perform this function? Therefore from that
point of view during a stable government it would be much better to have an
independent person to advice the ministry.
The other advantage of a nominated Governor is this. Take the case where there
is no majority party or the majority party is split into two or more sections
and there is a rivalry for premiership. In that event a person who is
completely detached from party politics of the province would be much better
than a person who is wedded to the party. If for instance, as unfortunately it
has happened in some provinces, the Congress party splits up into two groups
and each puts up a prospective premier of its own what would be the position of
an elected governor who will more or less be a follower or one or the other
prospective premiers? It would lead to unnecessary complications in the affairs
of the province. It would be much better that this person is nominated and thus
cut away from the party politics of the province, so that the competition or
the race between the rival groups is conducted in a fair, responsible and
constitutional manner. All things considered, it would be better to have a
Governor nominated by the Centre, who is free from the passions and jealousies
of local party politics.
Then take the contingency under which article 188 comes into operation. That is
a case of an emergency when the Governor has to exercise his discretion. He has
to report to the President and act under that the section for a period of two
weeks. In that event also if there is a real emergency in the province, a
person who is not connected with the party politics of the province would be
able to discharge that duty much better than when he is completely identified
with one or the other group.
Article 188 implies that the conditions in the province are such that a stable
government cannot possibly be carried on. If that is so, then it is advisable
that a person who is connected with this or that party should not occupy this
important position for he would, in that event, be responsible for the
maintenance of public tranquility in that province.
Take the further stage envisaged in article 188. When the constitution of a
province is suspended, a person who has the confidence of the Centre would be
of much greater use in restoring the stability of the province than a person
who is associated intimately with the politics of that province.
This view ultimately gathered strength from last April. It is not correct to
say that this decision was placed before the party at the last minute or that
there was no sufficient discussion upon it. A very large number of members have
come to the conclusion both from the constitutional point of view as well as
from the point of view of the country as a whole that the Governor should be
nominated person.
From all these points of view I hope the House will accept the amendment
unanimously.
The Honourable Shri Jawaharlal Nehru (United Provinces : General): Sir,
this debate has already elicited so many speeches that probably every
conceivable argument for and against this proposal has been placed before the
House. I do not know what I can add to it. I can well understand a certain
amount of hesitation on the part of the House to reconsider something that it
has already decided. That is right. Nevertheless it is pertinent to remember
the time when we considered this first. It was in July 1947, when my honourable
colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister brought this matter before the House and
the House then passed it. Nearly two years have passed--two years which have
made an enormous difference to the Indian scene. And if we seek to reconsider
something that we have passed two years ago, before the 15th August and in view
of all that happened after the 15th August 1947, it should not appear to be a
strange thing to do, for we have had a great deal of experience, bitter
experience during this period. I submit therefore that it is perfectly open to
us not only, as of course it is in law, but in reason to reconsider this matter.
In fact in the course of the last year on numerous occasion Committees of this
House considered this and other matters, not necessarily with a view to
changing them but with a view to co-ordinating them. There was the Union Powers
Committee: there was the Provincial Model Constitution Committee of which my
colleague the Deputy Prime Minister was the Chairman. After all these
considerations and discussions those committee felt that a certain change was
desirable. Thus even those like Sardar Patel, who themselves put this forward
in this House the other view, felt that change would be desirable.
Now the reasons for this have been stated before the House and I need not go
into them, except to say that I myself originally was not very definite, if I
may say so, in my mind as to which would be the preferable course. I preferred
something but not to the extent of considering it as absolutely necessary. But
the more I though about it, the more I conferred with others and discussed with
them, the more I felt that from almost every point of view this proposal that
is moved of a nominated Governor, in the present context of the Constitution,
was not only desirable from the practical point of view but from the democratic
point of view too it was desirable and worthwhile.
Now, one of the things that we have been aiming at a great deal has been to
avoid my separatist tendencies, the creation of groups, etc. We have decided
that we will not encourage communalism: we have abolished separate electorates
and reservation of seats, etc. We have yet to deal with many other separating
factors. We cannot deal with them by law of course. We have to deal with minds
and hearts. Nevertheless certain convention and practice helps or hinders the
growth of separatist tendencies. I feel that If we have an elected Governor
that would to some extent encourage that separatist provincial tendency more
than otherwise. There will be far fewer common links with the Centre. There
would, normally speaking, almost inevitably I imagine, be a Governor from that
particular province who stands for the governorship. As has been stated he
might be some kind of a rival almost in that particular majority group, which
for the moment controls that government of the province. Then there will be these
enormous elections on the basis of adult suffrage. Apart from the tremendous
burden of these elections for the provincial and central legislatures, to add
another election on this major scale would mean not only spending a tremendous
deal of the energy and time of the nation but also the money of the nation and
divert it from far more worthwhile projects. Apart from this it would
undoubtedly mean, I think, encouraging that rather narrow provincial way of
thinking and functioning in each province. Obviously, the provinces have
autonomy. Obviously, the provincial governments will function in a provincial
way representing the people. But are you going to help that tendency by also
making the provincial Governor much more of a provincial figure than he need be?
I think it would be infinitely better if he was not so intimately connected
with the local politics of the province, with the factions in the provinces.
And, as has been stated by Mr. Munshi, would it not be better to have a more
detached figure, obviously a figure that is acceptable to the province,
otherwise he could not function there? He must be acceptable to the province,
he must be acceptable to the Government of the province and yet he must not be
known to be a part of the party machine of that province. He may be sometimes,
possibly, a man from that province itself. We do not rule if out. But on the
whole it probably would be desirable to have people from outside--eminent
people, sometimes people who have not taken too great a part in politics. Politicians
would probably like a more active domain for their activities but there may be
an eminent educationist or persons eminent in other walks of life, who would
naturally, while co-operating fully with the Government and carrying out the
policy of the Government, at any rate helping in every way so that that policy
might be carried out, he would nevertheless represent before the public someone
slightly above the party and thereby, in fact, help that government more than
if he was considered as part of the party machine. I do submit that is really a
more democratic procedure than the other procedure in the sense that the latter
would not make the democratic machine work smoothly.
After all what is the test of a democracy? Carried to extremes it may be
perfectly democratic in the sense of elections everywhere but this may produce
conflicts, with the result that the machine begins to creak. Look round the
world today. How many governmental machines are working smoothly: how many are
creaking and how many are cracking up all the time for political or economic
reasons. There are very-very few stable democratic machines anywhere. In
providing for a stable democratic machine it is very important for us not to
take any step which might tend towards loosening the fabric of India or
loosening the governmental machinery and thus producing conflicts. We have
passed through very grave times and we have survived them with a measure of
success. We have still to pass through difficult times and I think we should
always view thing from this context of preserving the unity, the stability and
the security of India and not produce too many factors in our constitutional
machinery which will tend to disrupt that unity by frequent recourse to vast
elections which disturb people’s minds and at the same time divert a great deal
of our resources towards electoral machines rather than towards the
reconstruction of the country.
We must base democracy on the electoral process. We have done it. But the point
is whether we should duplicate it again and again. That seems to me
unnecessary, apart from leading to conflict and waste of energy and money and
also leading to a certain disruptive tendency in this big context of an
elective governor plus parliamentary system of democracy. Therefore I
should like to support fully the amendment proposed that the Governor should be
a nominated Governor.
One word, more, Sir. I think that an elective governor is almost invariably not
only likely to be of that province, but is likely hardly ever to represent any
of the numerous minority groups that exist in the country. Normally, of course,
the majority will probably have this for one of its members. But it is
obviously desirable that eminent leaders of minorities--I use the word for the
sake of simplicity; in future I hope we will not use the words ‘majority’ and ‘minority’--eminent
leaders of groups should have a chance. I think they will have a far better
change in the process of nomination than in election.
Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla (Assam: Muslim): Mr. President, Sir, the
intervention of our Prime Minister in this debate has loaded the dice and it is
useless for me to speak against him. But yet, for the sake of being consistent
in my principles, for the sake of the large population outside this House--I
mean the entire population of India--this matter ought to be discussed
thoroughly. The amendment which is being debated now goes to the very
fundamentals of the frame of the Draft Constitution. The drafters of the
Constitution, acting on the mandate that they received from the Constituent
Assembly, drew up the principle of election for the governors of the provinces.
The present amendment cuts at its very root and wants to lay down that the
Governors should be appointed by the President. So this matter needs to be
discussed very dispassionately, especially as the amendment wants to set aside
the previous judgment of the Constituent Assembly. We should literally draw up
a balance sheet of the advantages and the disadvantages of the principle of
election and of the principle of appointment so far as the governors of the
provinces are concerned. The supporters of the amendment lay stress of three
different points on account of which they believe that “appointment” is the
better arrangement. I will enumerate them one by one. Firstly, that an elected
governor alongside an elected Premier of a province will go against the smooth
working of the province and will be a negation of democracy. Sir, I contest
every word of this objection. The country is now divided into different
political parties or rather, the country is now governed by one political
party.
Shri Mahavir Tyagi: Every country is governed by one party.
Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla: I refuse to be side-tracked by Mr. Tyagi. To continue,
I challenge every word of the argument put forward. The country is now being
ruled by one leading political party. In a province, it is more likely, under
the principle of election, that the Governor as well as the Premier will come
from the same ruling party. The result will be that the administration of the
province will run smoothly, the Premier and the Governor working harmoniously.
Moreover, we want that India should be a secular democracy, a republic
engendering the idea of the citizens’ right to have a say in the administration
of the country. The elective principle gives that right to the citizen to have
a say in the appointment of even the ruler of his province. Again, we have
nurtured our people in the expectation that the principle of election adopted
two years ago will be left undisturbed. As against that we are told that an
appointed governor will lead to democracy and better administration in the
province.
Sir, it is said that in the provinces there are party factions and that passions
will be roused and therefore the Governor as well as the Premier will be
constantly at loggerheads. How can you assume that an appointed governor from
another province will help smoothen the administration of a province? We were
told yesterday, a leading politician from Western India may be sent by the
President as governor of a distant and benighted province like Assam or Orissa.
It is said that this political luminary will carry a detached mind. He will be
unbiased. He will not be embroiled in the politics of the province. Therefore
he will be able to bring a disinterested mind into consideration of the affairs
of the province. I grant all that. But in addition we must look into this one
potent factor that this gentleman will carry an empty mind so far as the
conditions of the province are concerned. To many of the western politicians,
the conditions of a distant province like Assam or Orissa are completely blank.
I have talked with many politicians in my time and I am appalled at the
ignorance of even the best informed so far as conditions in the east are
concerned.
Therefore, Sir, it cannot be said that the mere appointment of a Western India
politician to the Governorship will lead to better administration in the
province.
The next point that I would place before you is this: How do we assume that the
Cabinet in a province will be of the same political party as the Governor who
is appointed to that province? Then conditions will be worse and worse
confounded. The Governor under instructions from the Centre will try to run the
administration in a certain way, while the Cabinet of a different political
party would try to run it in their own way. Ultimately in this tussle, the
Cabinet must prevail and for the purpose of good government, the Governor
appointed by the President would have to be recalled. I think this is a
contingency which is not far in the distant future. I submit, Sir, that good
government is better than an ideal government. If good government is
accompanied by self-government then it is better than even mere good
government. Therefore, the principle of election is far more compatible with
the good and efficient governance of a province, plus the right of
self-government.
The second objection that was raised against election is the bogey of
expenditure. I said bogey, for not a single pice more than will be necessary in
a general election in a Province will have to be spent if a Governor is also to
be elected. Sir, I have experience of elections from the year 1911, very nearly
forty years. From what I have seen, in general elections, the elections for the
provincial legislature as well as the Central legislature are held
simultaneously. In the polling booths there is one box for the provincial
election and another box for the Central election. There is no additional cost.
The same Polling Office is there; the same Returing Officer is there and all
the polling staff is there. The voter has simply to put in his vote for the
provincial legislature in one box and his vote for the Central legislature in
another box.
The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha : (Bihar: General): If there is a
bye-election?
Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla: I am talking of a general election, which is
the rule. In talking of a bye-election, you are talking of the exception. You
cannot condemn a rule because of the exception. I therefore say, Sir, with all
the emphasis at my command that in those circumstances there will be no
additional expense in the election of a Governor.
Lastly, it has been said, and learned jurists have been brought in to support
the idea, that elected Governors are really nowhere to be found; everywhere he
is appointed, barring, of course, the U.S.A. We are told that the Canadian
system ought to be followed. Well, the Canadian system may be good for
conditions prevailing there. One jurist contradicted the other--I refer to my
colleagues in the Drafting Committee, Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar on the one
side and my Friend Mr. K. M. Munshi on the other. Mr. Munshi said that the Canadian
system cannot be ideal for India. Granting that we followed the Canadian
system, we will have to put in a rider, a big proviso, that conventions should
be established whereby the provincial Cabinet will have a say in the matter of
appointment. This was suggested by Shri Alladi. Here comes the whole question,
Sir. According to the Draft Constitution, the Governor has to be appointed
first and the Governor would then ask the leader of the largest party in the
legislature to form a Ministry in a Province. Now, where is the Ministry to be
consulted before the Governor is appointed by the President? Take again the
case, as I have already said, where the majority of the members of the
provincial legislature is composed of a party different from the party in power
at the Centre from which the President is bound to be chosen. Then the nominee
of the President cannot but be of his own party, and he and the majority party
in the provincial legislature will surely come to loggerheads.
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: Not necessarily.
Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla: We who have been condemning the British system
of appointing Governors from the I. C. C., we who have use every kind of
slogan, in order to remove that system of nomination or appointment by an
outside body, we who are enamoured of the democracy of the U.S.A., cannot do
better than follow the elective principle in the appointment of our Governors.
I know that the advocates of the status quo in the Draft
Constitution are up against a very strong stone wall. We cannot pit out
strength against the on-coming tide. We have been told by speaker after speaker
that originally they were all for the elective principle but they have now
given deeper thought to this matter and they are now enamoured of the principle
of appointment. Well, Sir, they are welcome to this change in their opinion,
but those honourable Members have not the monopoly of the ability to
concentrate their thoughts or of being better patriots. We too have thought
over the matter with as much calmness and with as much consideration of the
best interests of the country, and we are convinced that the elected Governor
is far more in accord with our nations of democracy than an appointed Governor.
Sir, the country is now being ruled by a certain party--I mean the great
Congress Party. Although opinion among this great Party is divided and although
this is an important fundamental matter in which each individual member ought
to have been allowed a free vote, what do we find Sir? A ukase has been issued,
the fiat has gone forth and a party whip is being distributed to every Member
whether he is a member of the Congress Party or not that every Congress
member......
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: On a point of order, Sir, is the
honourable Member in order in bringing in the Party decision and all that?
Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla: The whip has been distributed on the floor of
the House and in fact I have also been given a copy.
Mr. President: I am afraid some other honourable Members also have brought
in the name of the Party. That way the discussion here becomes very unreal.
When one of the members spoke, he said he was opposing the amendment, even
though, when the time came for voting, he would vote in its favour. I thought
that discussion might come to an end at that stage.
Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla: All I was going to say was about party strength
in this Constituent Assembly. This august House has a total of 303 Members at
present; if I remember aright, Sir, the Congress party controls 275 votes and
if members of the party are to follow the ukase, there is no chance for any
other opinion to prevail. I simply take my stand, as I said, in all humility
after the speech of the Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru only to record for
future generation the other side of the issue.
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari : Mr. President, Sir, after the frank
speech of the Honourable the Prime Minister, I do not think it is necessary to
convince anybody of the need for a change or a reversal in the decision of this
House in regard to the selection of the Governor of a province. But, Sir, there
have been a number of speakers, very erudite lawyers, experienced
administrators, and as it often happens when feelings run high, both the
supporters of a proposition and those who oppose it over-pitched their
arguments that they seek to put forward; and if anything, Sir, those people who
have been opposing this amendment have raised this bogey of concentration of
power in the Centre, of deprivation of the powers of the Provincial Government,
of stifling the spirit of democracy and so on. On the other hand, those who
supported this amendment, have drawn freely from analogies in other countries,
analogies which, it must be admitted, have a very limited application to the
circumstances of the case as it prevails in this country. Sir, I take it to be
my duty only to dispel one or two misconceptions that arise from some of the
previous speakers painting the picture rather in a highly coloured manner, and
also to answer one or two arguments that have been put forward by my respected
Friend, Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla, and which I think, had better be controverted
at this stage,--because his arguments looked extremely plausible and extremely
reasonable--but which on a careful examination reveal that they are neither
plausible nor reasonable. I would like to refer to the arguments used by my
respected Friend, Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar yesterday, in a very eloquent
speech in which he drew freely from the Canadian example, of the appointment of
the Lieutenant Governor by the Governor-General of Canada. I will ask the House
to examine the whole question for themselves, and they will then realise that
my honourable Friend Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, had no intention of using
that analogy as anything more than an analogy, and he had no intention of
asking this House to accept the entire scheme that obtains in Canada in regard
to the appointment of the Lieutenant Governor.
Sir, I would like to tell the House that when we borrow from the example of
Dominions like Canada and Australia, we forget that what obtains in those
countries today is something totally different from what they were in the
beginning. For instance, in Australia the appointment of the Governors until
the passing of the Statute of Westminster was done in the same way as it is
done in any colony. The position of the Governor in an Australian province was
that he was directly responsible to the Minister in charge of Commonwealth
Relations or whatever it was called at that time in London. He had direct
access to Whitehall: he could correspond direct and he often got instructions
direct from the British Ministry concerned because it was only after the
passing of the Statute of Westminster that Australia was recognized an undivided
unit and the system of British Minister directly corresponding with the
Governors of the various provinces, was allowed to pass into desuetude. In
regard to Canada where the constitutional position as it was some time back
bore some analogy to conditions in this country, there is one particular
principle that is in operation on which I would like to lay some emphasis which
will have no application to this country at all. It is avowed by every writer
on the Canadian constitution that the whole scheme of the appointment of
Lieutenant Governors and the control that the Dominion exercises over the
provinces is such that the ultimate control is in the hands of the Dominion
Government. Actually under the Canadian Constitution the Cabinet of the
Dominion issues instructions to the Lieutenant Governors; in fact they have
exercised their discretion in removing the Governor. Two instances are known in
which the Governors have been removed. The Lieutenant Governor in a Canadian
Constitution acts as an agent of the Dominion Government. I would at once
disclaim all ideas, at any rate so far as I am concerned, that we in this House
want the future Governor who is to be nominated by the President to be in any
sense an agent of the Central Government. I would like that point to be made
very clear, because such an idea finds no place in the scheme of Government we
envisage for the future. While considering the scheme of the distribution of
powers which will ultimately be settled by this House, if it is found necessary
that the Centre must have some powers reserved for itself in order to ensure
good Government in the provinces, in order to enable it to interfere when the
need for such interference arise we can adequately provide for that contingency
in the distribution of powers. There is no need for us to adopt an outworn
system, a system which has grown, because of historic traditions, because of
that figment of imagination which was actually translated into practice by
British ministers, namely, the preservation of the prerogative of the Crown in
the Dominions. We have no need to use that particular system not to impose the
will of the Centre, if it is necessary and if circumstances make it necessary,
on the provinces by means of making the Governor the agent for the purpose. Sir,
I think much of the objection that has been raised to this idea of nomination
would fall to the ground if this point is understood. We do not want either by
this particular article or by any other article that will be passed by this
House in future to make the Governor of a Province an agent of the Centre at
all. The utility of a nominated Governor has been very fully dealt with by the
Honourable the Prime Minister and I would like to tell Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla
this: Notwithstanding his conviction, notwithstanding the fact of these years
of struggle against British Imperialism which people have carried in various
ways and which Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla has carried on within the cabinets
functioning under the British Governors, we are fully convinced that we do not
want to give up the system of election where it is necessary; at the same time
we do not want to duplicate the system of elections.
I agree with one point made by my honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla that the argument
that is being advanced, that the election of a Governor will be an expensive
matter, is certainly beside the point. Democracy is an expensive affair. If
this House wants a democracy, it has got to go through the expenses of an
election, once, twice, thrice, as many times as it is necessary. I quite agree
with him that the expenses, annoyance, and the work that has got to be done,
that is being quoted as an insurmountable factor against the principle of
election, is beside the point.
What is really material, and what, I think, will probably ultimately persuade
the House to support the motion before the House is that we are really
providing for there being no room for any conflict. This point has been made
clear by many speakers, notably by the Prime Minister. Two persons, having more
or less equal authority, one elected more directly with a certainty of
tenure--mind you, he has a tenure of five years unless he could be in the
meantime impeached,--and the other person, whose tenure cannot be guaranteed
even for half an hour, these two people coming together, there undoubtedly will
be conflict. If you want election of the Governor by adult suffrage, there is
at least something to recommend it. The question of division of spoils in the
case of a party which has got a hold over the province cannot be done to its
fullest extent, because there is uncertainty about the election of the Governor
and uncertainty about the election of the aspirant for Chief Ministership as
the leader of the party. If, on the other hand, we adopt the alternative that
the Drafting Committee has recommended, namely election by the legislature of a
panel, then, it becomes a matter of mutual adjustment between two powerful
persons in the majority party of that particular province, one saying to the
other, “you shall be the Governor and I shall be the Chief Minister.” I do
feel, Sir, that if I am given only these two alternatives, election by adult
suffrage and election by the legislature, I would much rather vote for election
by adult suffrage. It does not mean that I like the idea, for the reason that
we do not want to create here and now the seeds of conflict in a province by
duplicating election in regard to the two important offices in the provincial
administration.
It has been said by my honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla that he fails to
appreciate the reasons that several Members in this House have given for
changing their point of view from what it was two years back to what it is today.
(Interruption). My honourable Friend Mr. B. Das. is not audible. I would
only say this in explanation. I think the reasons that I am adducing are those
which are still oppressing my honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla. He just now said
how we are admires of the United States Constitution. Yes; we are admirers of
the United States Constitution. But, we have not adopted that Constitution. We
have not adopted that Constitution because we believe and I believe very firmly
that the genius of the Indian people is most suited to a Parliamentary
democracy. If two years back we imported this principle of election for the
Governor, it is due to the very fault under which my honourable friend is now
labouring that was oppressing most of us. I was not one of them undoubtedly. We
were trying to frame a constitution and in doing so tried to introduce various
safeguards from various constitutions. Our mind was not very clear whether our
future constitution was going to follow an entirely Parliamentary system or was
going to be partly Parliamentary and partly Presidential. I think it is really
a tribute to the leaders in this House that they kept an open mind right up to
the end. They went on examining the question at various stages and finally came
to the conclusion that we shall adopt an entirely Parliamentary system of
Government completely free from any taint of the President system. Let me tell
my honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla what the position of the legislature vis-a-vis
the Governor is in the United States. The legislature is not summoned for a
year in some states. I suppose in certain States the obligation to summon the
legislature for passing the budget does not even exist. The meagre information
that we have in regard to the working of the States in the United States
Constitution, only makes us glean a little from side remarks here and there. I
was reading recently a text book by Justice Roy Jackson, on the supremacy of
the judiciary in America, wherein I found a categorical statement that in
certain States, the legislature is not summoned for two years. The position is,
either you make the legislature supreme or you make the Governor supreme. If
you adopt the Presidential system, the Governor is supreme. Under the
Parliamentary system, the legislature and the leader of the majority party in
the legislature will be supreme. The choice is obvious; and that choice is
logical. That is why we have come to this choice of a nominated governor.
I would like to go back to the reference made to the Canadian example. Let not
this House or the people outside be brought to think that we are borrowing
anything from the Canadian example. Our idea is that the Governor will be
appointed in the first place on the advice of the Prime Minister, who, in turn,
will consult the Chief Minister concerned, which particular person will have a
veto,--and I think conventions have already grown in that direction,--and the
person so selected will be a person who will hold the scales impartially as
between the various factors in the politics of this State. The advantages of
having a non-party man, a non-provincial man have been amply made out by the
Honourable Prime Minister. I would only say this. My honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla
was imagining a contingency which might perhaps exist in the initial stages,
but which cannot exist for all time: How is the Chief Minister to be consulted?
We are going to have new elections; there are already Governors appointed by
the President or the Prime Minister of the Central Government. How could it be
that the Chief Minister will be consulted in regard to the continuance or
otherwise of the Governor. Will there be a re-appointment of the Governor after
new Chief Minister takes charge? Hard cases do not always make bad law. In the
transitory stages, certain incongruities of this nature are bound to occur. He
has himself said that just because a particular thing is wrong, you cannot
condemn the whole scheme. It is quite possible that the Governor of a Province
who now functions would be quite willing to accept a re-nomination if
necessary, or to go out if the provincial Chief Minister who will come into
office does not like him. If they would like to have a man of their choice, if
they would like to have a man whom they have selected, I have no doubt, that if
we have a Prime Minister of the stature and outlook of the Honourable Pandit
Nehru, he will be the first person to leave it to the provincial Chief
Ministers to have their own way. I think that formidable contingency which was
worrying my honourable Friend Mr. Sa’adulla will be met, provided the Prime
Minister of India will be a person who understands democratic principles and
would always follow them.
One word more, Sir, in regard to some of the remarks of Pandit Hirday Nath
Kunzru. I quite agree that the remarks made by him are out of genuine
misgivings because, he felt doubts. I would only say this. In regard to the
articles as they appear further down in this Draft Constitution, I have no
doubt it is the intention of the House to change and shape all those articles
to fit in within the changes made earlier on. If he wanted that the provisions
of article 175 in regard to reservation of Bills should be specific, let us
make it specific. If my honourable Friend wants that the views of the Central
Government must be made very clear in regard to those subjects in which the
Central Government has got an interest, and the responsibility for reserving
the Bills should not be laid on the Governor, thereby creating an atmosphere of
odium for him and creating bad blood between him and the Chief Minister, let us
make it clear at the appropriate place. Let us say that in such circumstances,
in regard to concurrent subjects, the Governor may ask for instructions from
the President. We can make it clear beyond doubt.
In regard to article 188, I have a word to say. Article 188 has been viewed as
something isolated altogether by itself, without reference to article 278 on
which it is entirely based and it is said that that gives special powers to the
Governor and makes his Chief Minister a puppet. Article 188 is merely intended
to give the man on the spot an initiative for a very short period of fourteen
days. Often times it may happen that it may be seven days or five days. I shall
ask my honourable friends in this House to read article 278 and amend it if
necessary. Article 278 definitely says that the President who will come into
the picture within a fortnight, will have the support of the Parliament. All
that it seeks to do anyway is to transfer the responsibility in the case of a
province where the administration is bad or where the conditions are such that
strong action is needed, from the province to the Centre. In the Centre, we do
not envisage having an irresponsible Government. We shall have a President who
is controlled by his Prime Minister and the Prime Minister is in his turn
controlled by Parliament ultimately. Article 278 clearly lays down that the
President cannot act suo motu, of his own accord, and that he will have
to take the Parliament into his confidence. If one-man rule or the rule of the
Central Government by giving directions to the Governor is to continue, that
will be done only by the authority and sanction of Parliament where the
provincial representatives who will be in large numbers and will be able to
represent the views of the province. I have no doubt that no Prime Minister of
India of the future would ever completely disregard the views of the
representatives of a particular province when taking such drastic action as is
contemplated in article 188 in regard to a particular province.
Sir, I do not want to take up the time of the House further so much has been
said on this aspect but I would be failing in my duty if I do not mention a
word in regard to the possibility of voting on the motion before the House
envisaged by my honourable Friend, Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla. It is unfortunate
perhaps that the state of the country has been such that there is only one
party that took the lead in the matter of the liberation of this country and
the other party which could have co-operated effectively left this country bag
and baggage and went away somewhere else, and it is not the fault of the
Congress Party which happens to be the only party that fought for the freedom
of the country and therefore has a large number of members returned here. But
at the same time let me tell my honourable friend that the Congress Party is
not a party governed by dictators, that the majority opinion in that party
certainly obtains and nothing is done in order to twist the opinions of people
into a particular strait-jacket and make it appear as though it is the opinion
of the majority party of this House. If my honourable friend happens to be in a
minority, am I to be blamed, or is the Prime Minister to be blamed or the
Congress Party to be blamed? I can assure him that such of us individuals as
are members of the Party always maintain the view that the Party has got a
sacred trust to perform by reason of the fact that it is a majority here and
the Party never does anything which would run contrary to the views of a large
number of members in the party even though they may not be in a majority in
respect of their views on a particular matter. There is hardly any necessity to
import all these matters in a matter of this nature where ultimate issues that
are at stake are not very considerable. Let me tell my honourable Friend Syed
Muhammad Sa’adulla that the elected Governor is not going to be the champion of
liberty of the province, that he is not going to be the champion of the
minority interests, as again an elected Chief Minister. If we decide on an
elected governor we are only duplicating the process and provide room for
conflict. The possibility is that we might not be able to find men who will
perhaps fill the role that we want them to fill as Governors adequately by the
election method or perhaps even by the alternative method. But at the same
time, as I believe it has been said times without number, that a king who is a
genius often goes to the scaffold. Oftentimes a Governor who has enormous
abilities--intellectual and otherwise--will perhaps be a very unpopular person
and very possibly a steady experienced person like Syed Muhammad Sa’adulla
would perhaps make a better Governor than persons with genius who had been hand-picked.
The future is not in our hands. All that we can do is to envisages the future
with the limited capacity that God has given us. I do believe that wisdom lies
in the direction that this amendment indicates and I hope the House will accept
this.
Shri V. S. Sarwate (Madhya Bharat): Mr. President, I come from an Indian
State. I have listened very carefully to the discussions which have been going
on for these two days as to whether the Governors may be appointed by the
President or may be elected by the people; and I was wondering all along
whether the House has taken into consideration, or given sufficient attention,
to the fact that this Constitution is being framed not only for what I may call
non-State area but for the whole of India including Indian States as well. I
may point out that the Constitution which we are framing will be binding on
these States as well, as they would be a part of the future Union of India.
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: Article 128 specifically mentions that this
applies only to what are now called provinces and not to States.
Shri V. S. Sarwate: I may point out that since we are allowed to be here
and take part in the discussions it is assumed.........
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi: I did not say that he has no right. I was
only making a correction.
Shri V. S. Sarwate: Then he should have waited for a little more time
and seen how I proceeded. Now, the States would be bound by the Constitution
which we are making. As matters originally stood an option was given to these
States either to adopt the Constitution or to reject it; but in view of the
recent covenants I believe that option no longer exists. But even assuming that
it exists, there is no doubt that all the States would ultimately accept this
Constitution. So the position is that the Constitution of the future Union of
India which we are at present framing would apply to all areas included in the
Indian States. Therefore the House would have to take into consideration the
position of that person who in these States would be analogous to the Governor
in the provinces. The House may be knowing that in the States which have
acceded and which would be ultimately bound by this Constitution, either the
States individually or their Unions, have at their head Rajpramukhs, whose
position is if not hereditary, at least for their life-time. The Government of
India have bound themselves that this position of theirs would continue for
their life-time at least. If that be the position, then is it not a little
amusing to see that the discussion here is centering round as to whether the
appointments of Governors would be by election or not? The argument in favour
of the appointment of Governors by the President is this that if there is no
such appointment, the Prime Minister would not be able to discharge his
responsibility to maintain peace. Now the Indian States form one-third of the
whole of India. If the one-third is governed by Rajpramukhs who are not the
President’s nominees and if the Prime Minister would still be able to discharge
his duty or responsibility to maintain peace, then it can be very well imagined
that he can do the same with the Governors in the rest of India being his
non-appointees. In fact here is an incongruity. Either the House would have
ultimately to find out and make certain provisions by which these Rajpramukhs
would be brought on level with the Governors and their powers made identical
with Governor’s or the other alternative is this. Two years back there was a
Resolution adopted by this House, I am told, that the Governors should be
elected. It was then urged that if the Governors be not elected the principle
of democracy would be stifled, that the autonomous character of the provinces
would be lost. But the House has now veered to the view that Governors if
appointed would be better in the interest of the country. If no provision in
this Constitution is made to bring the Rajpramukhs on level with the Governors
regarding their powers then the other alternative is to veer still further and
when time comes for reconsideration of this constitution, then all the
Governors who may be holding office at that time may be made hereditary or at
least their tenure may be made to last for their life-time. These are the only
two alternatives before this House. I urge that the House will have to consider
provisions which may be necessary to bring the Rajpramukhs on level with
Governors. I sound this note of warning with the object that the House may not
lose sight of the important of such provisions. All along I find in the
Constitution no provisions are made so far for the States or their Unions. We
assume and it must be assumed in the circumstances of the case that the States
would form a part of the Union. But in spite of this assumption no provision is
being thought of as to how to make the Unions of States or States on level with
the provinces.
With this note of warning, I support the proposition that is before the House,
namely that the appointment of the Governors be made by the President.
Mr. President : Mr. Sidhva.
I hope this will be the last speech. We have had a very good discussion.
Shri Mahavir Tyagi : Sir, is that your ruling?
Mr. President : I have it in my mind, if you do not mind.
Shri R. K. Sidhva : Mr. President, I am not one of those who are
surprised at the attitude of those who voted last time for the election and now
the same persons are voting for nomination. When this question was discussed
nearly two years ago I held the view that the Governors of the provinces should
be nominated by the President. If you refer to my amendment on page 204 there
you will find the amendment which I sent in April last year. It reads as
follow:-
“The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President.”
Sir, there were some who felt along with me last time that the Governors should
be appointed by the President; but my views and the views of friends like me,
were a voice in the wilderness. But today the position is changed. My Friend
Mr. Rohini Kumar Chaudhari asked yesterday, “What has happened since then that
this change has taken place?” May I know, if a change has taken place in the
interest of the country, is it a sin or a crime? If those who opposed this
system, realised in time that the minority was right, if they now feel that the
minority was in the right, it is not honourable for them to change their views?
Is that anything wrong? On the contrary, I am grateful to them, that though
small men advocated this view, the big men have realised at a later stage that
this is the correct view, and therefore, I think they deserve greater credit.
Many felt last year, that the Governor’s appointment should be by nomination.
But it was by a mere fluke last time that this election wave that was in the
minds of Members carried the day. Mr. Dass said that in the top there would be
democracy and in the provinces autocracy. I fail however to understand how in
the provinces there will be autocracy. In the provinces the Members will come
to the legislatures through direct voting.
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari (Assam: General): On a point of order, Sir,
My honourable Friend is casting a reflection on the House when he says that
last time it was by a mere fluke that the thing was carried.
Mr. President: I do not think any reflection is meant. It is only a
question of language.
Shri R. K. Sidhva: The President who is elected by the people makes the
nomination. Do you call it autocracy? My Friends do not seem to realise the
difference between nomination in the British regime and nomination done now.
Does my Friend Mr. Das think that nomination by the Viceroy in the legislatures
in the past, by the Governors in the provincial legislatures and by
Commissioners and Collectors in the municipalities and District Boards, that
those nominations are identical with the nomination that is going to be made
now? If that is so, I am sorry for his intelligence. Our President will be
elected. And we do not want all our offices to become elected. After all the
fundamental position is that in the Legislature there will be election. And you
do not expect every office to go by election, and create chaos in the country.
That is the fundamental point that we have to bear in mind.
I do feel at the same time that the Governor’s position is a non-entity. He has
powers, and status. The Governor is the first citizen of the Province, I admit
that. But in the matter of the executive, he is a non-entity, and from that
point of view, nomination which does not mean nomination by someone who does
not enjoy the confidence of the people....
Shri B. Das (Orissa: General): If we import a few robots from America
will that do?
Shri R. K. Sidhva: If that is his argument, Sir, I cannot answer it.
Sir, another point in this policy which is at present adopted which I like is
this, and it is a very praiseworthy policy, that a person from that very
province should not be taken as the Governor of that Province. It is a very
healthy thing, and I fully support that policy, apart from individual
cases--there may be mistakes in the appointment of individuals. But as a matter
of policy, if you adopt the policy of appointing a Governor from the same
province, there will be so much bickering that you will bring the Governor into
disrepute. I do not want to mention names; but I should be failing in my duty
if I did not give one instance.
Mr. President: Please do not mention any names, or any instance which
could be easily spotted out.
Shri R. K. Sidhva: There is one whose character is beyond question,
whose independence cannot be questioned today, and.......
Shri B. Das: I strongly protest that smaller provinces do not have the
character or able men fit to be governors of other provinces. I say they have even
better character than men from Bombay and other places.
Mr. President: Mr. Sidhva is entitled to his own opinion.
Shri R. K. Sidhva: A person from a province, whose character cannot be
questioned, whose ability and whose integrity cannot be questioned, if he goes
to his own province, his name will be brought into disrepute. I do not want to
mention any names. If some have understood whom I mean, well and good.
Mr.
Das says that his province has got competent persons to be Governors of provinces
I said yesterday that all provinces have able men and there should be no grouse
that a particular province has been ignored, for the purpose of appointing
Governors; Mr. Das cheered what I said. But today he seems to have understood
something different and he raises points of order every time. I do feel, Sir,
that whosoever may be Prime Minister in the future, whosoever may be the
President, he should see that the question of all the provinces is borne in
mind. It is not as if able men exist only in a few provinces. Able men exist
today in all the provinces, and in making selections, the President should bear
in mind this fact. He should not look with any narrow vision, and he should see
that able men in the other provinces also get their chance. The view that a
person from his province should not be appointed a Governor, I strongly hold,
and I tell you if that policy is adopted we will simply bring the Governor into
disrepute. With these words, Sir, I whole-heartedly support the amendment.
The Honourable Shri Satyanarayan Sinha: Sir, I move:
“That the question be now put.”
Shri B. Das : Sir, before the closure is moved, I would request that I
may be given an opportunity of clarifying certain points, though I am bound to
vote for the amendment.
Mr. President : Is it any use speaking against the amendment when you
are going to vote for the amendment. I cannot allow that kind of thing.
Shri B. Das : We have been tied down.................
Mr. President : If you are tied down you have tied down yourself
in this House everybody is free to vote as he likes.
The question is:
“That the question be now put.”
The motion was adopted.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : (Bombay: General) : Mr.
President, Sir, after such a prolonged debate on the amendment I think it is
quite unnecessary for me to take the time of the House in making any prolonged
speech. I have risen only to make two things clear: one is to state to the
House the exact correlation between the two alternatives that have been placed
by the Drafting Committee before the House and amendment No. 2015 which has
been debated since yesterday. My second purpose is to state the exact issue
before the House, so that the House may be able to know what it is that it is
called upon to bear in mind in deciding between the alternatives presented by
the Drafting Committee and the new amendment.
Sir, the first alternative that has been put by the Drafting Committee is an
alternative which is exactly in terms of the decision made by this House some
time ago in accordance with the recommendations of a Committee appointed to decided
upon the principles governing the Provincial Constitution. The Drafting
Committee had no choice in the matter at all because according to the
directions given to the Drafting Committee it was bound to accept the principle
which had been sanctioned by the House itself. The question, therefore, arises:
why is it that the Drafting Committee thought it fit to present an alternative?
Now, the reason why the Drafting Committee presented an alternative is this.
The Drafting Committee felt, as everybody in this House knows, that the
Governor is not to have any kind of functions--to use a familiar phraseology, “no
functions which he is required to discharge either in his discretion or in his
individual judgment.” According to the principles of the new Constitution he is
required to follow the advice of his Ministry in all matters. Having regard to
this fact it was felt whether it was desirable to impose upon the electorate
the obligation to enter upon an electoral process which would cost a lot of
time, a lot of trouble and I say a lot of money as well. It was also felt,
nobody, knowing full well what powers he is likely to have under the
Constitution, would comeforth to contest an election. We felt that the powers
of the Governor were so limited, so nominal, his position so ornamental that
probably very few would come forward to stand for election. That was the reason
why the Drafting Committee thought the another alternative might be suggested.
It has been said in the course of the debate that the argument against election
is that there would be a rivalry between the Prime Minister and the Governor, both
deriving their mandate from the people at large. Speaking for myself, that was
not the argument which influenced me because I do not accept that even under
election there would be any kind of rivalry between the Prime Minister and the
Governor, for the simple reason that the Prime Minister would be elected on the
basis of policy, while the Governor could not be elected on the basis of
policy, because he could have no policy, not having any power. So far as I
could visualise, the election of the Governor would be on the basis of
personality: is he the right sort of person by his status, by his character, by
his education, by his position in the public to fill in a post of Governor? In
the case of the Prime Minister the position would be : is his programme
suitable, is his programme right? There could not therefore be any conflict
even if we adopt the principle of election.
The other arguments is, if we are going to have a Governor, who is purely
ornamental, is it necessary to have such a functionary elected at so much cost
and so much trouble? It was because of this feeling that the Drafting Committee
felt that they should suggest a second alternative. Now so far as the course of
debate has gone on in this House, the impression has been created in my mind
that most speakers feel that there is a very radical and fundamental difference
between the second alternative suggested by the Drafting Committee and this
particular amendment. In my judgment there is no fundamental distinction
between the second alternative and the amendment itself. The second alternative
suggested by the Drafting Committee is also a proposal for nomination. The only
thing is that there are certain qualifications, namely, that the President
should nominate out of a panel elected by the Provincial Legislature. But
fundamentally it is a proposal for nomination. In that sense there is no vital
and fundamental difference between the second alternative proposed by the
Drafting Committee and the amendment which has been tabled by Mr. Brajeshwar
Prasad. In other words, the choice before the House, if I may say so, is
between the second alternative and the amendment. The amendment says that the
nomination should be unqualified. The second alternative says that the
nomination should be a qualified nomination subject to certain conditions. From
a certain point of view I cannot help saying that the proposal of the Drafting
Committee, namely that it should be a qualified nomination is a better thing
than simple nomination. At the same time I want to warn the House that the real
issue before the House is really not nomination or election--because as I said
this functionary is going to be a purely ornamental functionary; how he comes
into being, whether by nomination or by some other machinery, is a purely
psychological question--what would appeal most to the people--a person
nominated or a person in whose nomination the Legislature has in some way
participated. Beyond that, it seems to me it has no consequence. Therefore, the
thing that I want to tell the House is this: that the real issue before the
House is not nomination or election, but what powers you propose to give to
your Governor. If the Governor is a purely constitutional Governor with no more
powers than what we contemplate expressly to give him in the Act, and has no
power to interfere with the internal administration of a Provincial Ministry, I
personally do not see any very fundamental objection to the principle of
nomination. Therefore my submission is..........
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari : Can he contemplate any situation, where a
Governor--whether you call him a mere symbol or not--will not have the power to
form the first Ministry? Will he not be competent to call upon any one, whether
he has a big majority or a substantial minority? And that is a very big power
of which he cannot be deprived under any circumstances.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Well that power an elected or a
nominated Governor will have. If he happens to call the wrong person to form a
Ministry, he will soon find to his cost that he has made a wrong choice. That
is not a thing that could be avoided by having an elected Governor. Such a
Governor may have a friend of his choice whom he can call in to form a Ministry
and that issue can be settled by the House itself by a motion of no-confidence
or confidence. But that is not the aspect of the question which is material.
The aspect of the question which is material is. Is the Governor going to have
any power of interference in the working of a Ministry which is composed of a
majority in the local Legislature? If that Governor has no power of
interference in the internal administration of a Ministry which has a majority,
then it seems to me that the question whether he is nominated or elected is a
wholly immaterial one. That is the way I look at it and I want to tell the
House that in coming to their decision they should not bother with the more or
less academic question--whether the Governor has to be nominated or to be
elected--they should bear in mind this question: What are the powers with which
the Governor is going to be endowed? That matter, I submit, is not before us
today. We shall take it up at a later stage when we come to the question of
articles 175 and 188 and probably by amendment or the addition of some other
clause which would give him powers. The House should be careful and watchful of
these new sections that will be placed before them at a later stage. But today
it seems to me. If the Constitution remains in principle the same as we intend
that it should be, that the Governor should be a purely constitutional
Governor, with no power of interference in the administration of the province,
then it seems to me quite immaterial whether he is nominated or elected.
Shri L. Krishnaswami Bharathi : Is the honourable Member accepting the
amendment?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I am leaving it to the House.
Mr. President : I shall then put amendment 2015 moved by Shri
Brajeshwar Prasad to the vote.
The question is:
“That for article 131, the following be substituted:-
‘131. The Governor of a State shall be appointed by the President by warrant
under his hand and seal.’ “
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President : I think after this all the other amendments to this
article fall to the ground and therefore I shall put the article as amended to
the vote.
Mr. President : The question is:
“That article 131, as amendment, stand part of the Constitution.”
The motion was adopted.
Article 131, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
----------
Article 132
Mr. President: We have a number of amendments to this article. Now that
we have decided in favour of one alternative, all the amendments favouring the
other alternative naturally fall to the ground. So we shall take up only those
amendments which are concerned with the article as now amended. The first
amendment is No. 2033 in the name of Shri Brajeshwar Prasad.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : I am not moving it.
Mr. President : There is an amendment by Dr. Ambedkar.
The Honourable
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:
“That with reference to amendment Nos. 2033 and 2041 of the List of amendments
for article 132, the following article be substituted:-
‘Term of office of Governor.--132 (1) The Governor shall hold office
during the pleasure of the President.
(2) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President;
resign his office.
(3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a Governor shall hold
office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his
office:
Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term,
continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.’“
Now, Sir, this article.........
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena: On a point of order, Amendment No. 2033 has
not been moved. There is another amendment 2041, to which this is an amendment.
But even that has not been moved.
Mr. President : But that has not been moved.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : Amendment No. 2041, stands in the name of
Dr. Ambedkar.
Mr. President: Well, he may formally move it.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : I have said that I am moving this in
place of that amendment.
Mr. President : Dr. Ambedkar is moving No. 2041.
Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava (East Punjab: General): The practice has been
that all these amendments are taken as moved and a person is entitled to move
any amendment.
Mr. President : We have not been following that practice.
Then you move your own amendment.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : Sir, I move:
“That for article 132, the following be substituted:-
‘132 The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.’ “
I commend this amendment for acceptance by the House and I have no further
comments to make.
Mr. President : If this amendment is carried, all other amendments fall to
the ground. Therefore we shall take up this amendment as covering all the other
amendments.
The amendment and the article are for discussion.
Prof. K. T. Shah (Bihar : General): Is my amendment No. 2034 not to be
moved? It suggests that the governor shall be irremovable and therefore cannot
be included under the amendment moved.
Mr. President : If the five-year term is carried, that falls to the
ground.
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari : The main point is whether as he is going to
hold office during the pleasure of the President he cannot be removed by the
President.
Mr. President : If the amendment of Dr. Ambedkar is carried, then 2034
falls to the ground. But Prof. Shah can speak upon it.
Prof Shibban Lal Saksena : Sir, both may be moved and the House may then
choose one of the two.
Mr. President : If Professor Shah wants it he may move it now.
Prof. K. T. Shah : I beg to move:
“That in article 132, after the word ‘office’ where it occurs for the second
time, the words ‘and shall during that term be irremovable from his office’ be
inserted.”
The amended article would read:
“The Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which
he enters upon his office and shall during that term be irremovable from his
office.”
This is, as I conceive it, different fundamentally from the appointment during
the pleasure of the President. The House, I am aware, has just passed a
proposition by which the governor is to be appointed by the President and it
would be now impossible for any one to question that proposition. I would like,
however, to point out, that having regard to the appointment as against the
elective principle, we must not leave the governor to be entirely at the mercy
or the pleasure of the President. We should see to it, at any rate that if he
is to be a constitutional head of the province, if he is to be acting in
accordance with the advice of his ministers, if we desire to remove any
objection that might possibly be there to the principle of nomination, we
should see to it that at least while he is acting correctly, in accordance with
the Constitution following the advice of his ministers, he should not be at the
mercy of the President who is away from the Province and who is a national and
not a local authority. This is all the more important pending the evolution of
a convention, such as was suggested by one of the previous speakers, that the
appointment, even if agreed to, should be on the advice of the local Ministry.
I do not know if such a convention can grow up in India, but even if it grows
up, and particularly if it grows up, it would be of the utmost importance that
no non-provincial authority from the Centre should have the power to say that
the governor should be removable by that authority; So long as he acts in
accordance with the advice of the constitutional advisers of the province, he
should I think be irremovable during his term of office, that is, five years
according to this article.
There is of course a certain provision with regard to resignation voluntarily
or other contingencies occurring whereby the Governor may be removed. But,
subject to that, and therefore to the entire Constitution, the period should be
the whole period and not at the pleasure of the President.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : We have passed the provision that he should
hold office during the pleasure of the President.
Prof. K. T. Shah : That has not yet been passed. Because you moved it,
if it is to be treated as passed, I have no objection.
Mr. President : There is an amendment by Mr. Gupta which has to be
moved. I see that he is not moving it. Then there are the amendments of Saiyid
Jafar Imam and Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad. They are not moving them.
Professor Shah may now move his amendments Nos. 2048, 2049 and 2051.
Prof. K. T. Shah : Sir, I move:
“That is clause (b) of the proviso to article 132, after the word ‘Constitution’,
in line 21, the words ‘or if found guilty of treason, or any offence against
the safety, security or integrity of the Union’, be inserted.”
That would make, Sir, if accepted, the removal of the Governor possible by his
own resignation or his being proved guilty of certain offences. This is by way
of providing for possible contingencies, not that any one expects or even
thinks that it is in the normal course likely that persons of that importance ‘would
be guilty of such offences. I therefore commend this amendment.
I now move my amendment No. 2049:
“That in article 132 after the existing proviso (b) the following new proviso
be added:-
‘(b-1) A Governor may be removed from office by reason of physical or mental
incapacity duly certified, or if found guilty of bribery or corruption, or as
provided for in article 137.’ “
These, again, are contingencies which may occur and therefore there must be
constitutional authority for the removal of the governor. I think it is nothing
but rounding off of the occasions where this extraordinary power may have
possibly to be exercised, namely the proving of the Governor as guilty of
bribery or corruption or mental or physical incapacity duly certified, not
merely suspected of such incapacity, but properly certified, and in that case
automatically the governor should be removable.
Sir, I now move my next amendment:
“That after article 132, the following new article 132-A be added:-
‘132 A. The office of the Governor shall fall vacant by his death before
completion of the term of office, or by resignation duly offered and accepted,
or as provided for otherwise by this Constitution. In the event of the office
of the Governor falling vacant at any time, the arrangements made for the
discharge of the functions of the Governor during such vacancy shall hold good
only pending the election of another Governor as provided for in this
Constitution.’“
For this purpose, he will have to be not appointed but elected. This again is
providing for a contingency, for an interregnum if I may say so, that is to
say, the office of the Governor falling vacant by death, resignation or for any
other reason specified in the Constitution, and his successor not being
available for the time being. Provision must be made for the discharge of the
functions belonging to the Governor during this interim period during which
there is no Governor whether appointed or otherwise provided for. I trust that
these simple provisions would prove acceptable to the House.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : Sir, the amendment moved by Dr. Ambedkar
makes a very great change in the provision originally made in article 132. I am
sorry he has not given any reasons why he has suggested this fundamental
change. Just now we have accepted a provision whereby the Governor shall be
nominated by the President. Already we feel that there democracy has been
abandoned. Now, Sir, comes this provision whereby the Governor shall hold
office only at the pleasure of the President. Even in the case of the Supreme
Court, we have provided that once the Judges of the Supreme Court have been appointed,
they will be removable only after an address presented by both the Houses of
Parliament, and by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. In
the case of the Governor, you want to make a different provision. It seems to
me, Sir, to be an extraordinary procedure and it completely takes away the
independence of the Governor. He will be purely a creature of the President,
that is to say, the Prime Minister and the party in power at the Centre. When
once a Governor has been appointed, I do not see why he should not continue in
office for his full term of five years and why you should make him removable by
the President at his whim. It only means that he must look to the President for
continuing in office and so continue to be subservient to him. He cannot be
independent. He will then have no respect. Sir, Dr. Ambedkar has not given any
reasons why he has made this change. Of course, the election of the Governors
has been done away with, but why make him removable by the President at his
pleasure? The original article says:-
“A Governor may, for violation of the Constitution, be removed from office by
impeachment in the manner provided in article 137 of this Constitution.”
It
means that a Governor can only be removed by impeachment by both the Houses.
Now, he will be there only at the pleasure of the President. Such a Governor
will have no independence and my point in that the Centre might try to do some
mischief through that man. Even if he is nominated, he can at least be
independent if after he is appointed he is irremovable. now, by making him
continue in office at the pleasure of the President, you are taking away his
independence altogether. This is a serious deviation and I hope the House will
consider it very carefully. Unless he is able to give strong reasons for making
this change, I hope Dr. Ambedkar will withdraw his amendment.
Shri Lokanath Misra (Orissa : General): Mr. President, Sir, after having
made the decision that Governors shall be appointed by the President, it
naturally follows that the connected provisions in the Draft Constitution
should accordingly be amended, and in that view, I accept the amendment that
has now been moved by Dr. Ambedkar. That amendment suggests that the Governor shall
be removable as the President pleases, that is, a Governor shall hold office
during the pleasure of the President and that whenever he incurs the
displeasure of the President, he will be out. When the President has appointed
a man, in the fitness of things the President must have the right to remove him
when he is displeased, but to remove the evil that has now crept in by doing
away with election for the office of the Governor, it would have been much
better if the State legislature too had been given the power to impeach him not
only for violation of the Constitution but also for misbehaviour. I use the
word ‘misbehaviour’ deliberately because, when a Governor who is not
necessarily a man of that province is appointed to his office, it is but
natural that the people of the province should have at least the power to watch
him, to criticise him, through their chosen representatives. If that right had
been given, in other words, if the provision for the impeachment of the
Governors by the State legislatures had been there, it would have been a
safeguard against improper appointment of Governors by the President. One of
the main objections to the appointment of the Governor by the President has
been that he will be a man who has no roots in the province and no stake, that
he will be a man who will have no connection with the people, that he will be a
man beyond their reach and therefore can go on merrily so long as he pleases
the President, the Prime Minister of the Union and the Premier of the Province.
But they are not all. It would have been much better if the Governor’s removal
had been made dependent not only on the displeasure of the President but on the
displeasure of the State legislature also which represents the people and that
would have been a safeguard against the evil that has been caused by the
provision for the appointment of Governors by the President.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Sir, the position is this:
this power of removal is given to the President in general terms. What Professor
Shah wants is that certain grounds should be stated in the Constitution itself
for the removal of the Governor. It seems to me that when you have given the
general power, you also give the power to the President to remove a Governor
for corruption, for bribery, for violation of the Constitution or for any other
reason which the President no doubt feels is legitimate ground for the removal
of the Governor. It seems, therefore, quite unnecessary to burden the
Constitution with all these limitations stated in express terms when it is
perfectly possible for the President to act upon the very same ground under the
formula that the Governor shall hold office during his pleasure. I, therefore,
think that it is unnecessary to categorize the conditions under which the
President may undertake the removal of the Governor.
Mr. President : The question is:
“That with reference to amendment Nos. 2033 and 2041 of the List of Amendments,
for article 132, the following article be substituted:-
Term of office of Governor.-(1) The Governor shall hold office during
the pleasure of the President.
(2) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office.
(3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a Governor shall hold
office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his
office.
Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term,
continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.”
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President : The question is:
“That article 132, as amended, stand part of the Constitution.” The motion was
adopted.
Article 132, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
----------
Article 133
Mr. President : There are several amendment that this article
should be deleted. Those are not amendments to be taken up. They are
practically negatives ones, and therefore, I take it that they need not be
moved.
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari : I would like to say that are unnecessary in
the context of the previous article.
Mr. President : The question is:
“That article 133 stand part of the Constitution.”
The motion was negatived.
Article 133 was deleted from the Constitution.
----------
Article 134
Mr. President : We have dropped the first alternative, and we have to
take the amendments only to the second alternative, and I think amendment No.
164 standing in the name of Dr. Ambedkar would cover.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:
“That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the List of Amendments, for
article 134, the following be substituted:-
‘Qualifications for appointment as Governor--”No person shall be
eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has
completed the age of thirty-five years’.”
Sir, may I take it that the amendment is moved?
Shri T.T. Krishnamachari : Mr. President, the Chair and the House can
permit the substitution of an amendment.
Mr. President : You need not read the amendment in full.
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : Sir, I moved Amendment No. 2061. Sir,
I also move that for amendment No. 2061, the following be substituted:-
‘Qualifications or appointment as Governor.-”No person shall be eligible
for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has completed
the age of thirty-five years’.”
(Amendment Nos. 2062, 2065 to 2071, 2075 to 2080, 2082, 2084
to 2087, 2089 and 2090 were not moved.)
Mr. President : The question is:
“That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the List of Amendment, for
article 134, the following be substituted:-
‘Qualifications for appointment as Governor.-”No person shall be
eligible for appointment as Governor unless he is a citizen of India and has
completed the age of thirty-five years.”
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
“That article 134, as amended, stand part of the Constitution.”
The motion was adopted.
Article 134, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
Mr. President : We may now go to article 135.
Shri A. Thanu Pillai (Travancore): May I know, Sir whether clause (2) of
that article stands, or that also goes?
Mr. President : The whole article has been substituted by the amendment.
Shri A. Thanu Pillai : Sir, the amendment reads thus:
“That with reference to amendment No. 2061 of the list of amendments, for
article 134, the following be substituted.” The original amendment reads thus: “
That for the existing clause (1) of article 134, the following be substituted:-”
The ultimate effect seems to be, that only sub-clause (1) has been amended and
clause (2) will stand as it is.
Mr. President : The effect of the amendment which has been carried is to
substitute the whole of article 134 by the amended article.
We may go to article 135.
----------
Article 135
Mr. President : The motion is:
“That article 135 form part of the Constitution.”
The Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar :
Sir, I move :
“That in clause (1) of article 135, for the words ‘either of Parliament or’, ‘the
words of either House of Parliament or of a House’ be substituted.”
This is a formal amendment.
Sir, I move:
“That in clause (1) of article 135-
(a) for the words ‘member of Parliament or’ the words ‘member of either House
of Parliament or of a House’ be substituted,
(b) for the words ‘in Parliament or such legislature as the case may be’ the
words in that House’ be substituted.”
Sir, I moved:
“That in clause (2) of article 135, for the words ‘or position of emolument’
the words ‘of profit’ be substituted.”
(Amendments Nos. 2092 and 2095 were not moved.)
Shri H.V. Kamath (C.P. & Berar: General): Mr. President, I move:
“That in clause (3) of article 135 the words ‘The Governor shall have an
official residence, and’ be deleted.”
Mr. President : “There” also must be deleted.
Shri H.V. Kamath : “There” will remain. “There shall be paid to the
Governor such emoluments, etc.,”. I wonder why our Constitution should be
cumbered with minutiae such as this. This matter about the official residence
of the Governor, is, in my estimation, not even a tremendous trifle. Our
Constitution would not be less sound if we omitted therein any reference to or
mention of the Governor’s official residence. Certainly, it stand to reason
that the Governor shall have a residence. We do not contemplate that the
Governor will be without an official residence. Don’t you visualise the Premier
in the province having a residence? But have we made mention of such a thing in
the Constitution? I do not know whether this was bodily lifted from some of the
unimportant constitutions of the world. Because, I am sure, the American
Constitution makes no mention of the official residence of the President or the
State Governors. I do not know which Constitution has given the inspiration to
Dr. Ambedkar and his colleagues of the Drafting Committee.
An Honourable Member : Irish Constitution.
An Honourable Dr. B.R. Ambedkar : We have passed article 48 exactly in
the same terms with reference to the President. Here, we are merely following
article 48.
Shri H.V. Kamath: I was coming to that point. I do not know why, simply
because the President’s residence has been mentioned, the Governor’s residence
should also be mentioned. Is it logical, is it rational, or does Dr. Ambedkar
think that because we have committed one little mistake--I should not say
that--we should repeat it?
This point was raised by me in the course of the discussion on article 48, Dr.
Ambedkar, in his reply to the debate could not give my convincing reply. May I,
Sir, for his benefit and to refresh his memory, read from what he said on that
occasion? Even with regard to the President’s residence, his reply was far from
convincing. We have now a nominated Governor. The President, of course, is much
higher dignitary than the Governor of a State. It certainly beats me why the
Governor’s official residence should be mentioned at all. In his reply to the
debate about the official residence of the President, this is what Dr. Ambedkar
said:
“But, the question I would like to ask Mr. Kamath is this. Does he or does he
not intend that the President should have an official residence and that
Parliament should make provision for it? And is there very much of a wrong if
the proposition was stated in the Constitution itself?”
I do not say that it is wrong at all. We are not perpetrating any wrong by
mentioning it in the Constitution. But, where is the necessity for this thing
to be brought into the Constitution? He went on to say: “This is merely a
matter of logic”. (I wonder what strange logic it was that he had in mind) “I
want to know if he does or does not support the proposition that the President
should have an official residence.” I then interrupted him: “May I know whether
the Prime Minister will or will not have an official residence?” He did not
give any reply to that, but proceeded: If he accepts that proposition, then it
seems to me a matter of small import whether a provision is made in the
Constitution itself or whether the matter is left for the future Parliament to
decide. The reason why we have introduced this matter in the Constitution is
that in the Government of India Act, in the several Orders in Council which
have been issued by the Secretary of State under the authority conferred upon
him by the Second Schedule of the Government of India Act, official residences,
both for the Governor-General and the Governors have been laid down.” Simply
because the Government of India Act has mentioned that, should we copy it
blindly without deliberating at all any further about it? I think that the
Constitution is, as I have said already, an elephantine one and it has been
encumbered with much unnecessary detail. We are mentioning this here because we
are following the Government of India Act, whether logically or illogically. It
might have been usefully and reasonably omitted.
One last point. The Governor may have more than one official residence. He may
have two residences. Suppose he is to be given two residences; but since the
Constitution mentions only one residence, what will happen? I hope Dr. Ambedkar
and his wise men will give some thought to this matter. I move, sir
(Amendment Nos. 2097 to 2102 were not moved.)
Mr. President: The amendments and the original article are open for
discussion.
Shri B. Das : Mr. President, article 135 deals with Governors’
perquisites, honorarium, and housing problem. It is presumed that the Governors
should be Congressmen or should have Congress ideals. Although my honourable
Friend Dr. Ambedkar did not move his amendment where he wanted to fix the
salaries of Governor at Rs. 4,500 p.m. the problem of salaries of Governors,
Governor-General or President had been agitating most of us for the last few
months. If Governors are to be Congress-minded people, are to follow Congress
ideals, the ideals that our worthy leader Rajagopalachari started that every
Congressman should live up to Rs. 150 and nothing more--that problem
Congressmen in this House at least must face once for all. Why should the
Governor-General have at present Rs. 7,500 free of Income-tax? Why should the
Drafting Committee or Dr. Ambedkar fix a Salary of Rs. 4, 500 for the
Governors? Of course it is presumed income-tax will be deducted from that
money.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : On a point of order. Are we passing the
schedule also along with this article.
Mr. President: We are not.
Shri B. Das: I am discussing the principle.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : We shall have an opportunity of discussing
that later on.
Mr. President: Let him develop the argument and I shall see.
Shri B. Das: The moment we pass this article, we give the privilege to
the Legislature to fix the salary and we know what is happening. The Parliament
on the other side fixed the salary of the Governor-General of Rs. 7,500 free of
Income-Tax.
Mr. President:
Are you quite correct Mr. Das, about the figure? I understood it was 5,500.
Shri B. Das :
No, Sir.
Some Honourable Members : It is Rs. 5,500.
Shri B. Das: I am sorry, Sir, I accept that correction. But to me, a
Congressman who was fed with the idea of Rs. 150 for every Congress Minister it
sound a big sum and we know the Governor-General is drawing a sumptuary
allowance of Rs. 63,000.
Mr. President: I think you had better not refer to the Governor-General.
Shri B. Das : The Governor in every province draw sumptuary allowances
also. There is something like Rs. 6,000 in poorer provinces and more in rich
provinces like Bombay and Madras and it is spent in paraphernalia and in
imitation of British pomp and splendour. Is it necessary that this sovereign
House would permit or approve the idea that Governors should spend huge sums of
money in pomp and splendour and should draw big salaries? Why should a
Congressman draw beyond Rs. 3,000 which is maximum limit that my Central
Ministers are drawing? I hope Governors are patriots. I know there are certain
benighted Knights who have been made Governors. Rs. 3,000 is pretty big sum for
them but when everything is new and there is the honour of being called H. E.
and being nominated by President, that should I think be sufficient. I am sorry
I could not participate in the debate on the previous clauses: but the only
thing emerges that these nominated Governors who are actually drones would now
apply to the President or the Governor-General that they are candidates for
Governors of Provinces: The Drafting Committee and the House has accepted
article 133 whereby such nominated creatures will go on all their lives as
Governors. The Draft article 133 was that he will hold office only once more.
In another article we discussed about the Supreme Court. We did not want the
Judges to accept jobs and hang round in the corridors of Dr. Ambedkar or Sardar
Patel. Now we find we create a class of drones in India who will hang round in
the corridors of the Governor-General or the Prime Minister of India, and who
would like to be perpetual Governors in spite of their being eighty-eight years
old or until they fall down. These are things which agitate me most and I hope
the House should be very careful in fixing emoluments of the these Governors.
The very fact that one is a nominated Governor is enough and if he is a
Congressman he will be happy and serve the country and if he is a
non-Congressman it is a high honour for him. The emoluments should be fixed
either by this House or by the Provincial Legislatures on the Congress standard
and I do except the Governors to behave as Congressmen and not as some of the
Governors behaved in the past.
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari : Sir, I am glad that this section
has been allowed partically to stand as it is. I only do not understand the
position taken up by my honourable Friend Mr. Kamath. He was one who has been
advocating nomination of the Governor; but it seems that after having nominated
him, he wants to throw him away. He wants to leave him to his own resources. He
perhaps forgets that this nominated Governor has to go to another Province
where he has very few friends. It is different with the Ministers. Ministers in
most provinces in India have their residences provided officially. Not only do
they have their official quarters, they have also got their furniture, screens,
motor-cars, and everything supplied to them.
Shri H. V. Kamath : May I know whether these are mentioned in the
Constitution?
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari : They are not in the Constitution, but I am
coming to that. That is not in the Constitution because the Ministries are
always in the hands of the majority party, and therefore they can have whatever
they want. Look at the position of the poor Governor. He is sent out from one
province to another province where probably he knows very few persons, where he
has probably been foisted upon that province against the will and consent of
the Ministry itself. In that case, the least that you can help him is with
shelter. If he has a Government Official residence, he can straightaway drive
into that place, at least he will have a shelter, and he can look for his food
afterwards. But if this is not provided for, then he has to go to this friend
and that friend, and ultimately he may fall into the hands of a commercial
magnate who will give him shelter, and we know commercial magnates are known to
give shelter to this kind of persons holding high positions. But the Governor
will fall under the obligation of some merchant Prince of the place.
Dr. P. S. Deshmukh ( C. P. & Berar: General): He may have even to go
back to his own province for want of a house. (Laughter)
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhari : So I say that official residence will have
to be provided for the Governor, otherwise it will be impossible for him to
carry on in that Province.
The provision which enables the Provincial Legislature to fix the salary of the
Governor is also a very sound proposition, because if the Ministry does not
approve of a particular governor, it may reduce his salary to Re. 1 and thus
compel him to leave the Province. That is a very strong and good safeguard
which has yet been left in this article, because if the majority of the members
of the legislature who are bound to reflect the opinion of the province
consider that the Governor is not a suitable person for their province, then
they can reduce his salary to Rs. 2 or Re. 1 as was done during the days of
dyarchy when the Ministers’ salaries were reduced to Re. 1 or Rs. 2. This is a
mighty weapon in the hands of the Provinces, and I am glad this weapon has been
left in the hands of the people of the province.
Secondly, I am interested in the allowances of the Governor. Next to his
salary. I like that the Governor should have his allowances. He should have
sumptuary allowance. This sumptuary allowance is intended for giving parties,
dinner parties, lunch parties and so on to different people. And I should think
particularly they should be given and it should be laid down that preference in
this matter should be given to the members of the legislature. There is no
attempt to interface with this sumptuary allowance and therefore, the Governor
enjoys this allowance. And if he gets this sumptuary allowance, he must have
some official residence. It does not look well that the Governor should give
his dinner parties and lunch parties and tea parties in different hotels. He
must have a residence for these parties at least. Mr. Kamath is not against
this sumptuary allowance, but he does not want the Governor to have a house
where he can utilise this sumptuary allowance. What is the Governor to do with
the allowance then? The first and foremost duty of a Governor today is to give
parties,--dinner-parties, tea-parties and parties of various other kinds. He
has got to do it in order to maintain his own popularity, and also to maintain
the popularity of the Ministry. If he finds anything wrong anywhere, he has to
go out there and deliver some lectures in support of the Ministry. Besides
these, there are functions like Prize-distributions, important marriages in
high life,--all these things the Governor has got to attend to keep up his
popularity. Therefore. I submit that his having an official residence should
not be interfered with and this clause should be passed as it stands.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : Mr. President, Sir, I think this is the proper
place where I can suggest to the House, and to the members of the Drafting
Committee in particular, that they should incorporate some provision to the
effect, that the same person may be appointed Governor of two or three or more
provinces at a time.
Mr. President: You did not move any such amendment.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : I am not moving any amendment, but I am only
suggesting to the House, to change this article so as to accommodate the
suggestion that I am making. I feel that my suggestion will effect a great deal
of economy, if one Governor is made responsible as the Constitutional Head for
the administration of more than one province. Formerly the provinces of Bihar,
Bengal, Orissa and Assam were under one Governor. Ultimately these Provinces
will become one once again. With this end in view I am suggesting that the same
person may be appointed Governor of two or more Provinces at a time.
Dr. P. S. Deshmukh : Sir, on a point of order. This is contrary to the
clause we have already passed that each province shall have a Governor. (Hear,
Hear).
Mr. President: I am in entire agreement with Dr. Deshmukh. We have
already passed an article that every province shall have a Governor.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : Then I have nothing more to add.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : Sir, My Friend Mr. B Das raised the
question of emoluments of the Governors given in the Schedule mentioned in this
article. The question of emoluments attached to our high offices is a very
important question. I do not think that under this article we can properly
discuss the emoluments given in the Schedule, but as you have ruled that these
might be discussed. I would like to say a few words. We as Congressmen are
pledged to certain scales and to certain standards of life. But I am sorry to
have to say that we have forgotten all that we said before. In Karachi Congress
we passed a resolution that the maximum salary of the highest official shall be
only Rs. 500 and in view of the present increase in the cost of living it may
now be fixed at Rs. 2,000. But here we are providing for a salary of Rs. 4,500 for
the Governors. The Governor is merely a cipher, without any function and
holding office only during the President’s pleasure. I do not think this large
amount is necessary for him. In addition to this salary he has his allowances
also. When the proper Schedule comes up, I will say more. But here I will only
say that by accepting this article, we are not accepting the amounts fixed in
the Schedule.
Shri M. Thirumala Rao : Mr. President, Sir, I was under the
impression that the Drafting Committee’s amendment No. 2100-
“That the following proviso be added to clause (3) of article 135 :-
‘Provided that the emoluments of the Governor shall not be less than four
thousand and five hundred rupees per month.’ “
will
be moved.
I think, Sir, that there should be a uniform policy adopted in regard to the
emoluments and salaries of these Governors which I think now obtains. There is
no use leaving the matter to the sweet will of the respective Legislatures,
which may be swayed by so many considerations in fixing the salaries of the
Governors. If necessary, Governorships may be divided into different
categories, e.g., first-rank, second-rank, etc., according to the income of the
provinces. But the Governors’ emoluments should not be so variable as to depend
upon the respective influences of the legislatures. Governors are expected to
enjoy a status, though not power, above the Legislatures and the Ministries and
they have to uphold certain tradition and prestige in the eyes of the public.
Therefore, their salaries should not be made the play-thing of legislative
forms where different parties may have their own motives for reducing the
emoluments of the Governors. I suggest, Sir, that both for the President as
well as for the Governors the Constitution should fix a certain amount of
salary as well as sumptuary and other allowances which should not be subject to
the influence of the Legislatures. I wish the Drafting Committee will take up
this matter and bring in suitable amendments in this behalf.
Shri Brajeshwar Prasad : Sir, I want your ruling as to how my
amendment is not pertinent. Article 149 says that there shall be a Governor for
each State. If only means that there cannot be a Province without a Governor.
The article does not debar the same person from being appointed as Governor of
two or more provinces at a time.
Mr. President : No occasion for a ruling arises, because the
honourable Member did not move his amendment.
I shall now put the amendment to vote. The first amendment is that moved by Dr.
Ambedkar.
The question is:
“That in clause (1) of article 135, for the words ‘either of Parliament or’ the
words ‘of either House of Parliament or of a House’ be substituted.”
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
“That in clause (1) of article 135-
(a) for the words ‘member of Parliament or’ the words ‘member of either House
of Parliament or of a House’ be substituted.
(b) For the words ‘in Parliament or such Legislature as the case may be’ the
words ‘in that House’ be substituted.”
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
“That in clause (2) of article 135, for the words ‘or position of emolument’
the words ‘of profit’ be substituted.”
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
“That in clause (3) of article 135 the words “The Governor shall have an
official residence, and’ be deleted.”
The amendment was negatived.
Mr. President: The question is:
“That article 135, as amended, stand part of the Constitution.”
The motion was adopted.
Article 135, as amended, was added to the Constitution.
Mr. President: There is notice of an amendment by Professor Shah
suggesting the addition of a new article 135.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Before we go to the next amendment I
would like to suggest that in article 135, the word “elected” be dropped.
Mr. President: That is understood.
----------
New Article 135-A
Prof. K. T. Shah : Sir I beg to move:
“That after article 135 the following new article 135-A, be added:-
‘135-A. Every Governor shall, on completion of his term of office and
retirement, be given such pension or allowance during the rest of his life as
the State Legislature may by law provide;’
‘Provided that during the life-time of any such Governor who has retired, the
pension or allowance granted to him shall not be varied to his prejudice;’
‘Provided further that such pension shall be allowed only on condition that any
such Governor in retirement does not hold any other office of profit in the
State or under the Government of India.’“
Sir, I want by this amendment to secure to eminent public servants and distinguished
sons of India who rise to such offices as the Governor of State a decent
retirement allowance, so that they should not be exposed to any want or penury,
or to any temptation which might lead them to use their influence acquired in
the past by holding such offices in any undesirable manner.
The Constitution, Sir, does not provide any such consideration for people who
rise to high offices in the State, except in regard to the Judiciary. In the
Judiciary this has been provided by the Constitution. Speaking for myself, I do
not see any reason why exalted public servants and officers, who have served
the State and the country in such high capacities like that of the President,
or the Governor, should not be provided for the rest of their lives, so that
they should be free from any want or temptation to utilise their influence in
any undesirable manner.
I have not deliberately indicated the scale of such pension. I have also
suggested the condition that the pension is payable only if the person
concerned retires. That is to say, he really devotes himself for the rest of
his life to the honorary service of the country in whatever way may be open to
him free from any want, and that he does not hold any other office of profit in
the State in which he has been Governor or under the Government of India. If,
of course, he holds any other office which carries its own emoluments, he will
have to choose between either the pension or those emoluments,. But subject to
this, that he holds no other office, the pension should be available to him for
the rest of his life in retirement.
The object of providing such security for the persons who have risen to this
high level is the same as that which now secures to every workman in civilized
nations an old-age pension, a pension or super-annuation allowance, which would
be calculated to suffice to maintain him in the standard of life to which he
was accustomed while at work. A pension is deferred pay, not paid to the worker
while at work; and the analogy will hold here also. This also is a type of
work--perhaps the highest of its kind--which should not go unprovided for
altogether by the State for the rest of the period on earth of the Parties who
have served so eminently the State.
I take it, Sir, that no one would be appointed or elected Governor, who has not
in the past, before being so appointed also rendered service, which has earned
him the distinction, the eminence of public position that makes him fit for
selection as a Governor. That being so, and his services being of that level
culminating in his appointment as Governor should, I think in the fitness of
things be recognized and rewarded in some such manner as I am suggesting. As I
said before, it is not necessary in this Constitution to provide the actual
scale of such allowances or pension. All that is necessary is that the
principle should be recognised, and I would leave it to the State Legislature
to make the necessary provision, on condition however, that the provision once
made by law, shall not be varied to the prejudice of the holder of such pension
while he enjoys it in retirement. This is a very simple and in my opinion a
very fair proposition, provided the House will accept it.
Dr. P. S. Deshmukh : Sir, my Friend Prof. K. T. Shah wants that
pensions should be provided for the Governors. I have considerable sympathy for
the point of view that he has placed before the House, because as a rule,
except under exceptional circumstances, we shall be appointing men from the
public life of India to these offices and in Public life there are not many
people who have large balances or considerable property. So I think there is
everything to be said in favour of making some provision for a public man who,
at the fag end of his life more or less, becomes a Governor and is so appointed
by the President under the Constitution we are framing but when after the
completion of his term of office he retires, has nothing to fall back on. But
in spite of all our sympathies we will have also to admit that if we accept the
amendment, there are many difficulties that will arise. First and foremost,
what would be defined as his term of office? Suppose a person is appointed in a
bye-vacancy and he also completes his term of office, whatever it may be. It
might be six-months, or one year or two years. Does he, Prof. Shah, propose
that even such a person should have proportionate pension or whether he would
propose something less? Secondly, I do not think this has been followed at any
time anywhere so far and those who have had the good fortune of being appointed
Governors I do not think, have claimed it or asked for it. On the whole, I
think the advantage will remain in not giving any such pension. Of course my
Professor friend has advanced the argument that this would be by way of a
reward, and if he accepts any other office, then he should not be entitled to
any pension. But I think a public man who offers himself for this appointment,
will have to content himself with whatever salary that might be given to him during
his tenure of office, and I do not think any one would be right in looking
forward to a pension. If we provide pension for such people, we will have next
to consider the cases of the Ambassadors and many other persons more or less of
similar categories. A whole set of people will then be coming forward for these
pensions and probably a very large portion of our revenues will have to be
spent on these pensions alone. On principle, also, I do not think it is a good
proposal and I therefore oppose it.
Sardar Hukam Singh (East Punjab:
Sikh) : Sir, I come here to oppose this motion. I feel there is no
justification for lending this additional lustre to our Governors. We have been
told that they are figure-heads only and ornamental heads and that they shall
have no authority or powers. Again in the way that we are proceeding, I think
we are depriving them in the States and Provinces of every authority that they
could have. All powers are being centralised. The residuary subjects are also
with the Centre. Under such circumstances, when the Governors have to do
nothing, when they are only constitutional heads, when they are only ornaments,
we have given them sufficient luster by the salary of Rs. 4,500, other
emoluments, sumptuary allowances, official residences and such other things. On
the other hand, the Professor wants to give those Governors even additional
things, so that they might live princely lives even after they have retired.
I am opposed
to it and I do not see any justification in giving these additional things to
these Governors who would be merely titular heads and denuded of all authority
in the provinces or States.
Mr. President : The question is:
“That after article 135 the following new article 135-A, be added :-
‘135-A. Every Governor shall, on completion of his term of office and
retirement, by given such pension or allowance during the rest of his life as
the State Legislature may by law Provide;’
‘Provided that during the life-time of any such Governor who has retired, the
pension or allowance granted to him small not be varied to his prejudice;’
‘Provided further that such pension shall be allowed only on condition that any
such Governor in retirement does not hold any other office of profit in the
State or under the Government of India.’“
The amendment was negatived.
----------
Article 136
Mr. President: There is an amendment of which we have received notice,
by Dr. Ambedkar. It is No. 2104. There are other amendments which are more or
less of a similar nature.
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : My amendment in List 2--No. 132--follows
more or less the wording of article 49 which this House has passed.
Mr. President: Let the amendment be moved first: then we can take up amendment
No. 132. Dr. Ambedkar, I take it that you have moved amendment No. 2104?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move:
“That in article 136 for the words “in the presence of the members of the
Legislature of the State’ the words ‘in the presence of the Chief Justice or,
in his, absence, any other judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the State’ be substituted.”
Shri T. T. Krishnamachari : Sir, I move:
“That for amendment No. 2106 of the List of amendment, the following be
substituted :-
“That in article 136, for the words ‘in the presence of the members of the
Legislature of the State’ the words ‘in the presence of the Chief Justice of
the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State or, in his
absence the senior most judge of that Court available’ be substituted.
This does not need any explanation for the reason that it follows, as I said,
the wording of article 49 which the House has adopted. At any rate it would not
be proper in view of the different method of selection of the Governor now
decided on that he should take the oath before the Legislature. It is only
proper that the Chief Justice of the High Court, exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the State, should perform the function the function, or in his
absence the senior-most judge of the Court.
Sir, I move.
(Amendment Nos. 2105 and 2107 were not moved.)
Shri H. V. Kamath : Sir, I move:
“That for amendment No. 2106 of the List of Amendments the following be
substituted:--”
“That in article 136, for the words I, A.B., do solemnly affirm (or swear) the
following be substituted :-
swear in the name of God”
“I, A.B, do -----------------------------
solemnly affirm
This follows the amendment which was accepted unanimously by the House about
the oath or affirmation to be made by the President under article 49 of the
Draft Constitution. You, Sir, were unfortunately not in the Chair on that
occasion. You were lying ill at Wardha from which illness happily by the grace
of God you recovered rapidly and we are fortunate to have you again in this
House to preside over its deliberations.
I do not propose to make any speech, because I have said what I had to say on
that occasion. I would only say this that we would be true to our heritage and
true to our spiritual genius if we adopt an amendment of this nature, with
regard to the oath or affirmation to be made by the Governor of a State. I
commend this amendment for the acceptance of the House.
Mr. President: As amendments Nos. 2107, 2108 and 2109 are not, I
understand, being moved, does Dr. Ambedkar wish to make any reply to the amendments
moved?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I accept the amendment
moved by Shri T. T. Krishnamachari and also the one moved by my Friend Mr.
Kamath.
Mr. President : The question is:
“That for amendment No. 2104 of the List of Amendments, the following be
substituted :-
“That in article 136, for the words ‘in the presence of the members of the
Legislature of the State’ the words ‘in the presence of the Chief Justice of
the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the State or, in his
absence the senior-most judge of that Court available’ be substituted.’“
The amendment was adopted.
Mr. President: The question is:
“That for amendment No. 2106 of the List of Amendments, the following be
substituted :-
“That in article 136, for the words ‘I, A. B., do solemnly affirm (or swear’)
the following be substituted :-
swear in the name of God”
‘I, A, B, do -----------------------------
solemnly affirm
The amendment was adopted.
Pandit Hirday Nath Kungru (United Provinces : General) : How does the
oath read? Is it, “I do swear in the name of God, or I do solemnly affirm,” or
not? The question is this : some people may think that the Governor should take
oath in the name of God. There may however be people in this country who are
atheists. (Interruptions) (Mr. President read out the oath) I see that
there is an alternative. That is what I wanted to know. Nobody should be
compelled to swear in the name of God if--he does not want to do so.
Mr. President: No, no. The question is:
“That article 136, as amended, stand part of the Constitution.”
The motion was adopted.
Article 136, as amended, was added to the
Constitution.
The Assembly then adjourned till Eight of the Clock on Wednesday, the 1st June
1949.
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